85 lines
3.0 KiB
Python
85 lines
3.0 KiB
Python
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"""
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Django's standard crypto functions and utilities.
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"""
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import hashlib
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import hmac
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import random
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import time
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from django.conf import settings
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from django.utils.encoding import force_bytes
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# Use the system PRNG if possible
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try:
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random = random.SystemRandom()
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using_sysrandom = True
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except NotImplementedError:
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import warnings
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warnings.warn('A secure pseudo-random number generator is not available '
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'on your system. Falling back to Mersenne Twister.')
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using_sysrandom = False
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def salted_hmac(key_salt, value, secret=None):
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"""
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Return the HMAC-SHA1 of 'value', using a key generated from key_salt and a
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secret (which defaults to settings.SECRET_KEY).
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A different key_salt should be passed in for every application of HMAC.
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"""
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if secret is None:
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secret = settings.SECRET_KEY
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key_salt = force_bytes(key_salt)
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secret = force_bytes(secret)
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# We need to generate a derived key from our base key. We can do this by
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# passing the key_salt and our base key through a pseudo-random function and
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# SHA1 works nicely.
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key = hashlib.sha1(key_salt + secret).digest()
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# If len(key_salt + secret) > sha_constructor().block_size, the above
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# line is redundant and could be replaced by key = key_salt + secret, since
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# the hmac module does the same thing for keys longer than the block size.
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# However, we need to ensure that we *always* do this.
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return hmac.new(key, msg=force_bytes(value), digestmod=hashlib.sha1)
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def get_random_string(length=12,
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allowed_chars='abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'
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'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789'):
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"""
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Return a securely generated random string.
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The default length of 12 with the a-z, A-Z, 0-9 character set returns
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a 71-bit value. log_2((26+26+10)^12) =~ 71 bits
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"""
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if not using_sysrandom:
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# This is ugly, and a hack, but it makes things better than
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# the alternative of predictability. This re-seeds the PRNG
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# using a value that is hard for an attacker to predict, every
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# time a random string is required. This may change the
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# properties of the chosen random sequence slightly, but this
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# is better than absolute predictability.
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random.seed(
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hashlib.sha256(
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('%s%s%s' % (random.getstate(), time.time(), settings.SECRET_KEY)).encode()
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).digest()
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)
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return ''.join(random.choice(allowed_chars) for i in range(length))
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def constant_time_compare(val1, val2):
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"""Return True if the two strings are equal, False otherwise."""
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return hmac.compare_digest(force_bytes(val1), force_bytes(val2))
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def pbkdf2(password, salt, iterations, dklen=0, digest=None):
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"""Return the hash of password using pbkdf2."""
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if digest is None:
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digest = hashlib.sha256
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dklen = dklen or None
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password = force_bytes(password)
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salt = force_bytes(salt)
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return hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac(digest().name, password, salt, iterations, dklen)
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