27 lines
162 KiB
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27 lines
162 KiB
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J. V. StalinSource : Works, Vol. 10,
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August - December, 1927
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Publisher : Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow,
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1954
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Transcription/Markup : Salil Sen for MIA, 2009
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Public Domain : Marxists Internet Archive (2009). You
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may freely copy, distribute, display and perform this work; as well as make derivative
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and commercial works. Please credit "Marxists Internet Archive" as your source. Comrades, I should like, first of all, to deal with the attacks of Kamenev, Zinoviev and Trotsky on sections of the Comintern, on the Polish section of the Comintern, on the Austrian, British and Chinese sections. I should like to touch on this question because they, the oppositionists, have muddied the waters here and have tried to throw dust in our eyes as regards our brother parties, whereas what we need here is clarity and not opposition twaddle.The question of the Polish Party. Zinoviev boldly stated here that if there is a Right deviation in the person of Warski in the Polish Party, it is the Communist International, the present leadership of the Comintern, that is to blame. He said that if Warski at one time adopted—and he certainly did adopt—the standpoint of supporting Pilsudski's troops, the Comintern is to blame for it.That is quite wrong. I should like to refer to the facts, to passages, well-known to you, of the verbatim report of the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission held in July of last year,I should like to refer to and cite the testimony of a man like Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who stated at the time that if there was a Right deviation in the Polish Party, it was fostered by none other than Zinoviev.That was during the days of the so-called Pilsudski rising, 2 when we, the members of the Polish Commission of the E.C.C.I. and of the Central Committee of our Party, which included Dzerzhinsky, Unszlicht, myself, Zinoviev and others, were drafting the resolutions for the Communist Party of Poland. Zinoviev, as the Chairman of the Comintern, submitted his draft proposals, in which he said, among other things, that at that moment in Poland, when a struggle was flaring up between the forces that were behind Pilsudski and the forces that were behind the Witos government of Poland, that at such a moment, a policy of neutrality on the part of the Communist Party was impermissible and that for the time being no sharp pronouncements against Pilsudski should be made.Some of us, including Dzerzhinsky, objected and said that that directive was wrong, that it would only mislead the Communist Party of Poland. It was necessary to say that not only a policy of neutrality, but also a policy of supporting Pilsudski was impermissible. After some objections, that directive was accepted with our amendments.By this I want to say that it does not need much courage to come out against Warski, who made a mistake at that time and was suitably rebuked for it; but to blame others for one's own sins, to shift the blame for fostering the Right deviation in the Polish Party from the guilty one, Zinoviev, to the Comintern, to the present leaders of the Comintern, means to commit a crime against the Comintern.You will say that this is a trifle and that I am wasting my time on it. No, comrades, it is not a trifle. The struggle against the Right deviation in the Polish Party is continuing and will continue. Zinoviev has—well, what is the mildest way I can put it—the audacity to assert that the Right deviation is supported by the present leadership of the Comintern. The facts, however, show the opposite. They show that Zinoviev is slandering the Comintern, that he is blaming others for his own sins. That is a habit with Zinoviev, it is nothing new for him. It is our duty, however, to expose this slanderous habit of his on every occasion.About Austria. Zinoviev asserted here that the Austrian Communist Party is weak, that it failed to assume the leadership of the action that took place recently in Vienna. 3 That is true and not true. It is true that the Austrian Communist Party is weak; but to deny that it acted correctly is to slander it. Yes, it is still weak, but it is weak because, among other things, there is not yet that profound revolutionary crisis of capitalism which revolutionises the masses, which disorganises Social-Democracy and rapidly increases the chances of communism; it is weak because it is young; because in Austr
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About the Canton Kuomintang government:"The revolutionary government created by the Kuomintang party in Canton* has already succeeded in establishing contact with the widest masses of the workers, peasants, and urban democracy, and, basing itself on them, has smashed the counterrevolutionary bands supported by the imperialists (and is working for the radical democratisation of the whole political life of the Kwangtung Province). Thus, being the vanguard in the struggle of the Chinese people for independence, the Canton government serves as a model for the future revolutionary-democratic development of the country"* (ibid.).It turns out that the Canton Kuomintang government, being a bloc of four "classes," was a revolutionary government, and not only revolutionary, but even a model for the future revolutionary-democratic government in China./p>
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About the united front of workers, peasants and the bourgeoisie:"In face of the new dangers, the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang must develop the most wide-spread political activity, organising mass action in support of the struggle of the people's armies, taking advantage of the contradictions within the camp of the imperialists and opposing to them a united national revolutionary front of the broadest strata of the population (workers, peasants, and the bourgeoisie) under the leadership of the revolutionary-democratic organisations"* (ibid.).It follows that temporary blocs and agreements with the bourgeoisie in colonial countries at a certain stage of the colonial revolution are not only permissible, but positively essential.Is it not true that this is very similar to what Lenin tells us in his well-known directives for the tactics of Communists in colonial and dependent countries? It is a pity, however, that Zinoviev has already managed to forget that.The question of withdrawal from the Kuomintang:"Certain sections of the Chinese big bourgeoisie, which had temporarily grouped themselves around the Kuomintang Party, withdrew from it during the past year, which resulted in the formation on the Right wing of the Kuomintang of a small group that openly opposed a close alliance between the Kuomintang and the masses of the working people, demanded the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang and opposed the revolutionary policy of the Canton government. The condemnation of this Right wing at the Second Congress of the Kuomintang (January 1926) and the endorsement of the necessity for a militant alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communists confirm the revolutionary trend of the activities of the Kuomintang and the Canton government and ensure for the Kuomintang the revolutionary support of the proletariat"* (ibid.).It is seen that withdrawal of the Communists from the Kuomintang at the first stage of the Chinese revolution would have been a serious mistake. It is a pity, however, that Zinoviev, who voted for this resolution, had already managed to forget it in about a month; for it was not later than April 1926 (within a month) that Zinoviev demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Communists from the Kuomintang./p>
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About the deviations within the Chinese Communist Party and the impermissibility of skipping over the Kuomin-tang phase of the revolution:</p>
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"The political self-determination of the Chinese Communists will develop in the struggle against two equally harmful deviations: against Right Liquidationism, which ignores the independent class tasks of the Chinese proletariat and leads to a formless merging with the general democratic national movement; and against the extreme Left sentiments in favour of skipping over the revolutionary-democratic stage of the movement to come immediately to the tasks of proletarian dictatorship and Soviet power, forgetting about the peasantry, that basic and decisive factor in the Chinese movement for national emancipation"* (ibid.).As you see, here are all the grounds for convicting the opposition now of wanting to skip over the Kuomin-tang phase of development in China, of underestimating the peasant movement, and of dashing post-haste towards Soviets. It hits the nail right on the head.Do Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky know about this resolution?We must assume that they do. At any rate Zino-viev must know about it, for it was under his chairmanship that this resolution was adopted at the Sixth Plenum of the Comintern and he himself voted for it. Why are the leaders of the opposition now avoiding this resolution of the highest body of the world communist movement? Why are they keeping silent about it? Because it turns against them on all questions concerning the Chinese revolution. Because it refutes the whole of the present Trotskyist standpoint of the opposition. Because they have deserted the Comintern, deserted Leninism, and now, fearing their past, fearing their own shadows, are obliged cravenly to avoid the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Comintern.That is how matters stand as regards the first stage-of the Chinese revolution.Let us pass now to the second stage of the Chinese revolution.While the distinguishing feature of the first stage was that the spearhead of the revolution was turned mainly against foreign imperialism, the characteristic feature of the second stage is that the spearhead of the revolution is now turned mainly against internal enemies, primarily against the feudal landlords, against the feudal regime.Did the first stage accomplish its task of overthrowing foreign imperialism? No, it did not. It bequeathed the accomplishment of this task to the second stage of the Chinese revolution. It merely gave the revolutionary masses the first shaking up that roused them against imperialism, only to run its course and hand on the task to the future.It must be presumed that the second stage of the revolution also will not succeed in fully accomplishing the task of expelling the imperialists. It will give the broad masses of the Chinese workers and peasants a further shaking up to rouse them against imperialism, but it will do so in order to hand on the completion of this task to the next stage of the Chinese revolution, to the Soviet stage.There is nothing surprising in that. Do we not know that analogous facts occurred in the history of our revolution, although in a different situation and under different circumstances? Do we not know that the first stage of our revolution did not fully accomplish its task of completing the agrarian revolution, and that it handed on that task to the next stage of the revolution, to the October Revolution, which wholly and completely accomplished the task of eradicating the survivals of feudalism? It will therefore not be surprising if the second stage of the Chinese revolution does not succeed in fully completing the agrarian revolution, and if the second stage of the revolution, after giving the vast masses of the peasantry a shaking up and rousing them against the survivals of feudalism, hands on the completion of this task to the next stage of the revolution, to the Soviet stage. That will only be a merit of the future Soviet revolution in China.What was the task of the Communists at the second stage of the revolution in China, when the centre of the revolutionary movement had obviously shifted from Canton to Wuhan, and when, parallel with the revolutionary centre in Wuhan, a
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15. In an article on the development of the Chinese revolution of 1925-27, A. Martynov (a former Menshevik who was admitted to membership of the R.C.P.(B.) by the Twelfth Party Congress) advanced the thesis that the revolution in China could peacefully evolve from a bourgeois-democratic revolution into a proletarian revolution. The Trotsky-Zinoviev anti-Soviet bloc tried to thrust responsibility for Martynov's mistaken thesis upon the leadership of the Comintern and of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
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16. See J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 9, p. 366.
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17. See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 15-18.
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18. See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 25, pp. 164-70.
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19. The Anglo-Soviet, or Anglo-Russian, Unity Committee (the Joint Consultative Committee of the trade-union movements of Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.) was set up on the initiative of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions at an Anglo-Russian trade-union conference in London, April 6-8, 1925. The committee consisted of representatives of the A.U.C.C.T.U. and of the General Council of the British Trades Union Congress. The committee ceased to exist in the autumn of 1927 owing to the treacherous policy of the reactionary leaders of the British trade unions. (On the Anglo-Russian Committee, see J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 8, pp. 193-202, 205-14.)
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20. See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 1-97.
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21. See J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 4, pp. 258-59.
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22. This refers to the shooting, in accordance with the sentence pronounced on June 9, 1927, by the Collegium of the OGPU of the U.S.S.R., of twenty monarchist whiteguards for conducting terrorist, sabotage and espionage activities. These whiteguards had been sent to the U.S.S.R. by the intelligence services of foreign countries; among them were former Russian princes and members of the nobility, big landlords, industrialists, merchants and guards officers of the tsarist army.
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23. The Curzon ultimatum—the Note dated May 8, 1923, sent by Lord Curzon, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, threatening a new intervention against the U.S.S.R.
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24. Sotsialistichesky Vestnik (Socialist Herald) — a magazine published by Menshevik whiteguard emigres. From February 1921 to March 1933 it was published in Germany, and later in France and the U.S.A. The magazine is the mouthpiece of the reactionary whiteguard emigres.
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25. Rul (Helm) — a Cadet, whiteguard emigre newspaper, published in Berlin from November 1920 to October 1931.26. J. V. Stalin, "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East" (see Works, Vol 7, pp. 135-54).27. V. I. Lenin, "The United States of Europe Slogan" (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 21, p. 311). 28. This refers to the resolution "The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I." adopted by the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) held April 27-29, 1925 (see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 43-52).29. This refers to the resolution on the report of the Central Committee adopted by the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) held December 18-3 1, 1925 (see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 73-82).30. This refers to the resolution on "The Opposition Bloc in the C.P.S.U.(B.)" adopted by the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) held October 26 to November 3, 1926 (see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 209-20). 31. This refers to the resolution on the Russian question adopted by the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern held November 22 to December 16, 1926 (see Theses and Resolutions of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, Moscow-Leningrad, 1927, pp. 60-70). 32. This refers to the resolution on the Russian question adopted at the Fifth Congress of the Communist International held June 17 to July 8, 1924 (see The Fifth World Congress of the Communist International Theses, Resolutions and Decisions, Moscow 1924, pp. 175-86).33. V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 427-35. 34. "Ossovskyism"—a counter-revolutionary "theory" that tried to justify the formation of a Trotskyist party in the U.S.S.R. This "theory" was propounded by the Trotskyist Ossovsky, who was expelled from the C.P.S.U.(B.) in August 1926. 35. This refers to the resolution "On Party Unity" adopted by the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) held March 8-16, 1921 (see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part I, 1953, pp. 527-30). 36. The "Workers' Truth" group — a counter-revolutionary underground group formed in 1921. The members of this group were expelled from the R.C.P.(B.). Collected Works Index |
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Volume 10 Index
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Works by Decade |
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J. V. Stalin Archive
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Marxists Internet Archive
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