przemowoAnalizator/trockizm/Report_of_the_CC_to_the_16th_Congress_of_the_CPSU(B).txt

First Published: Pravda, No. 177, June 29, 1930
Source: Works, J.V. Stalin, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1955, volume 12, pp. 242-385
Transcription/HTML Markup: Hari Kumar for Alliance Marxist-Leninist (North America)/Charles Farrell
Online Version: Stalin Reference Archive (marxists.org) 2000 Comrades, since the Fifteenth Congress two and a half years have passed. Not a very long
period one would think. Nevertheless, during this period most important
changes have taken place in the life of peoples and states. If one were
to characterise the past period in two words, it could be called
a turning point period. It marked a turning point not only
for us, for the USSR, but also for the capitalist countries all over
the world. Between these two turning points, however, there is a fundamental
difference. Whereas for the USSR this turning point meant a turn in
the direction of a new and bigger economic upswing, for the
capitalist countries it meant a turn towards economic decline.
Here, in the USSR, there is a growing Upswing of
socialist development both in industry and in agriculture. There, among
the capitalists, there is growing economic crisis
both in industry and in agriculture.Such is the picture of the present situation in a few words.Recall the state of affairs in the capitalist countries two and a half years ago.
Growth of industrial production and trade in nearly all the capitalist
countries. Growth of production of raw materials and food in nearly all
the agrarian countries. A halo around the United States as the land of
the most full-blooded capitalism. Triumphant hymns of "prosperity." Grovelling
to the dollar. Panegyrics in honour of the new technology, in honour of
capitalist rationalisation. Proclamation of an era of the "recovery" of
capitalism and of the unshakable firmness of capitalist stabilisation.
"Universal" noise and clamour about the "inevitable doom" of the Land of
Soviets, about the "inevitable collapse" of the USSR
That was the state of affairs yesterday.

And what is the picture today?Today there is
an economic crisis in nearly all the industrial countries of capitalism.
Today there is an agricultural crisis in all the agrarian countries. Instead
of "prosperity" there is mass poverty and a colossal growth of unemployment.
Instead of an upswing in agriculture there is the ruin of the vast masses
of the peasants. The illusions about the omnipotence of capitalism in general,
and about the omnipotence of North American capitalism in particular, are
collapsing. The triumphant hymns in honour of the dollar and of capitalist
rationalisation are becoming fainter and fainter. Pessimistic wailing about
the "mistakes" of capitalism is growing louder and louder. And the "universal"
clamour about the "inevitable doom" of the USSR is giving way to "universal"
venomous hissing about the necessity of punishing "that country" that dares
to develop its economy when crisis is reigning all around.Such is the
picture today.Things have
turned out exactly as the Bolsheviks said they would two or three years
ago.The Bolsheviks
said that in view of the restricted limits of the standard of living of
the vast masses of the workers and peasants, the further development of
technology in the capitalist countries, the growth of productive forces
and of capitalist rationalisation, must inevitably lead to a severe economic
crisis. The bourgeois press jeered at the "queer prophesies" of the Bolsheviks.
The Right deviators dissociated themselves from this Bolshevik forecast
and for the Marxist analysis substituted liberal chatter about "organised
capitalism." But how did things actually turn out? They turned out exactly
as the Bolsheviks said they would.Such are the
facts.Let us now
examine the data on the economic crisis in the capitalist countries.a) In studying
the crisis, the following facts, above all, strike the eye:
1. The present economic crisis is a crisis of over-production.
This means that more goods have been produced than the market can absorb.
It means that more textiles, fuel, manufactured goods and food have been
produced than can be purchased for cash by the bulk of the consumers, i.e.,
the masses of the people, whose incomes remain on a low level. Since, however,
under capitalism, the purchasing power of the masses of the people remains
at a minimum level, the capitalists keep their "superfluous" goods, textiles,
grain, etc., in their warehouses or even destroy them in order to bolster
up prices; they cut down production and discharge their workers, and the
masses of the people are compelled to suffer hardship because too many
goods have been produced.2. The present crisis is the first post-war world
economic crisis. It is a world crisis not only in the sense that it
embraces all, or nearly all, the industrial countries in
the world; even France, which is systematically injecting into her organism
the billions of marks received as reparations payments from Germany, has
been unable to avoid a certain depression, which, as all the data indicate,
is bound to develop into a crisis. It is a world crisis also in the sense
that the industrial crisis has coincided with an agricultural
crisis that affects the production of all forms of raw materials and
food in the chief agrarian countries of the world.3. The present world crisis is developing unevenly,
notwithstanding its universal character; it affects different
countries at different times and in different degrees. The industrial crisis
began first of all in Poland, Rumania and the Balkans. It developed there
throughout the whole of last year. Obvious symptoms of an incipient agricultural
crisis were already visible at the end of 1928 in Canada, the United States,
the Argentine, Brazil and Australia. During the whole of this period United
States industry showed an upward trend. By the middle of 1929 industrial
production in the United States had reached an almost record level. A break
began only in the latter half of 1929, and then a crisis in industrial
production swiftly developed, which threw the United States back to the
level of 1927. This was followed by an industrial crisis in Canada and
Japan. Then came bankruptcies and crisis in China and in the colonial countries,
where the crisis was aggravated by the drop in the price of silver, and
where the crisis of overproduction was combined with the ruination of the
peasant farms, which were reduced to utter exhaustion by feudal exploitation
and unbearable taxation. As regards Western Europe, there the crisis began
to gain force only at the beginning of this year, but not everywhere to
the same degree, and even in that period France still showed an increase
in industrial production.I do not think there is any need to dwell particularly
on the statistics that demonstrate the existence of the crisis. Nobody
now disputes the existence of the crisis. I shall therefore confine myself
to quoting one small but characteristic table recently published by the
German Institute of Economic Research. This table depicts the development
of the mining industry and the chief branches of large-scale manufacturing
industry in the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Poland and the
USSR since 1927; the 1928 level of production is taken as 100.Here is the table:What does this table show?It shows, first of all that the United
States, Germany and Poland are experiencing a sharply expressed crisis
in large-scale industrial production; in the first quarter of 1930,
in the United States, after the boom in the
first half of 1929, the level of production dropped 10.8 per cent compared
with 1929 and sank to the level of 1927; in Germany, after
three years of stagnation, the level of production dropped
8.4 per cent compared with last year and sank to 6.7 per cent below the
level of 1927; in Poland, after last year's crisis,
the level of production dropped 15.2 per cent compared with last year
and sank to 3.9 per cent below the level of 1927.Secondly, the table shows that Britain
has been marking time for three years, round about the 1927 level,
and is experiencing severe economic stagnation; in the first
quarter of 1930 she even suffered a drop in production of 0.5 per cent
compared with the previous year, thus entering the first phase of a crisis.Thirdly, the table shows that of the
big capitalist countries only in France is there a certain growth
of large-scale industry; but whereas the increase in 1928 amounted
to 13.4 per cent and that in 1929 to 9.4 per cent, the increase in the
first quarter of 1930 is only 3.7 per cent above that in 1929, thus presenting
from year to year a picture of a descending curve of growth.Lastly, the table shows that of all
the countries in the world, the USSR is the only one in which a powerful
upswing of large-scale industry has taken place; the level of production
in the first quarter of 1930 was more than twice as high
as that in 1927, and the increase rose from 17.6 per cent in 1928 to 23.5
per cent in 1929 and to 32 per cent in the first quarter of 1930, thus
presenting from year to year a picture of an ascending curve
of growth.It may be said that although such was
the state of affairs up to the end of the first quarter of this year, it
is not precluded that a turn for the better may have taken place in the
second quarter of this year. The returns for the second quarter, however,
emphatically refute such an assumption. They show, on the contrary, that
the situation has become still worse in the second quarter. These returns
show: a further drop in share prices on the New York Stock
Exchange and a new wave of bankruptcies in the United States;
a further decline in production, a reduction of wages
of the workers, and growth of unemployment in the United
States, Germany, Britain, Italy, Japan, South America, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
etc.; the entry of a number of branches of industry in France into a state
of stagnation, which, in the present international economic
situation, is a symptom of incipient crisis. The number of unemployed in
the United States is now over 6,000,000, in Germany about 5,000,000, in
Britain over 2,000,000, in Italy, South America and Japan a million each,
in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria half a million each. This is apart
from the further intensification of the agricultural crisis, which is ruining
millions of farmers and labour-mg peasants. The crisis of overproduction
in agriculture has reached such a pitch that in Brazil, in order to keep
up prices and the profits of the bourgeoisie, 2,000,000 bags of coffee
have been thrown into the sea; in America maize has begun to he used for
fuel instead of coal; in Germany, millions of poods of rye are being converted
into pig food; and as regards cotton and wheat, every measure is being
taken to reduce the crop area by 10-15 per cent.Such is the general picture of the
developing world economic crisis.b) Now, when the destructive effects
of the world economic crisis are spreading, sending to the bottom whole
strata of medium and small capitalists, ruining entire groups of the labour
aristocracy and farmers, and dooming vast masses of workers to starvation,
everybody is asking: what is the cause of the crisis, what is at the bottom
of it, how can it be combated, how can it he abolished? The most diverse
"theories" about crises are being invented. Whole schemes are being proposed
for "mitigating," "preventing," and "eliminating" crises. The bourgeois
oppositions are blaming the bourgeois governments because "they failed
to take all measures" to prevent the crisis. The "Democrats" blame the
"Republicans" and the "Republicans" blame the "Democrats," and all of them
together blame the Hoover group with its "Federal Reserve System", (Original
Footnote: The Federal Reserve System was instituted in the U.S.A. In 1913.
Twelve Federal Reserve Banks in the major centres of the country co-ordinate
and control all the activities of the American banks and are an instrument
of monopoly capital. The System is headed by a Federal Reserve Board (re-named
in 1933 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), the members
of which are appointed by the U.S. President, and which is completely under
the thumb of the financial magnates. The American bourgeois economists
- apologists of American capitalism - and financial and government circles
in the U.S.A. considered that the Federal Reserve System would safeguard
the country's economy against crises. The attempts of President Hoover
to cope with the crisis that broke out in 1929 with the help of the Federal
Reserve System proved a complete failure) which failed to "curb"
the crisis. There are even wiseacres who ascribe the world economic crisis
to the "machinations of the Bolsheviks". I have in mind the well-known
"industrialist" Rechberg who, properly speaking, little resembles an industrialist,
hut reminds one more than anything of an "industrialist" among literary
men and a "literary man" among industrialists. (Laughter.)It goes without
saying that none of these "theories" and schemes has anything in common
with science. It must be admitted that the bourgeois economists have proved
to be utter bankrupts in face of the crisis. More than that, they have
been found to be devoid even of that little sense of reality which their
predecessors could not always be said to lack. These gentlemen forget that
crises cannot be regarded as something fortuitous under the capitalist
system of economy. These gentlemen forget that economic crises are the
inevitable result of capitalism. These gentlemen forget that crises were
born with the birth of the rule of capitalism. There have been periodical
crises during more than a hundred years, recurring every 12, 10, 8 or less
years. During this period bourgeois governments of all ranks and colours,
bourgeois leaders of all levels and abilities, all without exception tried
their strength at the task of "preventing" and "abolishing" crises. But
they all suffered defeat. They suffered defeat because economic crises
cannot be prevented or abolished within the framework of capitalism. Is
it surprising that the present-day bourgeois leaders are also suffering
defeat? Is it surprising that far from mitigating the crisis, far from
easing the situation of the vast masses of the working people, the measures
taken by the bourgeois governments actually lead to new outbreaks of bankruptcy,
to new waves of unemployment, to the swallowing up of the less powerful
capitalist combines by the more powerful capitalist combines? The basis,
the cause, of economic crises of over-production lies in the capitalist
system of economy itself. The basis of the crisis lies in the contradiction
between the social character of production and the capitalist form of appropriation
of the results of production. An expression of this fundamental contradiction
of capitalism is the contradiction between the colossal growth
of capitalism's potentialities of production, calculated to yield the
maximum of capitalist profit, and the relative reduction
of the effective demand of the vast masses of the working people whose
standard of living the capitalists always try to keep at the minimum
level. To be successful in competition and to squeeze out the utmost
profit, the capitalists are compelled to develop their technical equipment,
to introduce rationalisation, to intensify the exploitation of the workers
and to increase the production potentialities of their enterprises to the
utmost limits. So as not to lag behind one another, all the capitalists
are compelled, in one way or another, to take this path of furiously developing
production potentialities. The home market and the foreign market, however,
the purchasing power of the vast masses of workers' and peasants who, in
the last analysis, constitute the bulk of the purchasers, remain on a low
level. Hence overproduction crises. Hence the well-known results, recurring
more or less periodically, as a consequence of which goods remain unsold,
production is reduced, unemployment grows and wages are cut, and all this
still further intensifies the contradiction between the level of production
and the level of effective demand. Overproduction crises are a manifestation
of this contradiction in turbulent and destructive forms.If capitalism
could adapt production not to the obtaining of the utmost profit but to
the systematic improvement of the material conditions of the masses of
the people, and if it could turn profits not to the satisfaction of the
whims of the parasitic classes, not to perfecting the methods of exploitation,
not to the export of capital, but to the systematic improvement of the
material conditions of the workers and peasants, then there would be no
crises. But then capitalism would not be capitalism. To abolish crises
it is necessary to abolish capitalism.Such is the
basis of economic crises of overproduction in general.We cannot,
however, confine ourselves to this in characterising the present
crisis. The present crisis cannot be regarded as a mere recurrence
of the old crises. It is occurring and developing under certain new conditions,
which must be brought out if we are to obtain a complete picture of the
crisis. It is complicated and deepened by a number of special circumstances
which must be understood if we are to obtain a clear idea of the present
economic crisis.What are these special circumstances?These special circumstances can be reduced to the following
characteristic facts:1. The crisis
has most severely affected the principal country of capitalism,
its citadel, the United States, in which is concentrated not less
than half the total production and consumption of all those countries in
the world. Obviously, this circumstance cannot but lead to a colossal expansion
of the sphere of influence of the crisis, to the intensification of the
crisis and to the accumulation of extra difficulties for world capitalism.2. In the course
of development of the economic crisis, the industrial crisis in the chief
capitalist countries did not merely coincide but became interwoven
with the agricultural crisis in the agrarian countries, thereby aggravating
the difficulties and predetermining the inevitability of a general decline
in economic activity. Needless to say, the industrial crisis will intensify
the agricultural crisis, and the agricultural crisis will prolong the industrial
crisis, which cannot but lead to the intensification of the economic crisis
as a whole.3. Present-day
capitalism, unlike the old capitalism, is monopoly capitalism,
and this predetermines the inevitability of the capitalist combines fighting
to keep up the high monopolist prices of goods, in spite of over-production.
Naturally, this circumstance, which makes the crisis particularly painful
and ruinous for the masses of the people who constitute the main consumers
of goods, cannot but lead to prolonging the crisis, cannot but be an obstacle
to resolving it.4. The present
economic crisis is developing on the basis of the general crisis
of capitalism, which came into being already in the period of the imperialist
war, and is sapping the foundations of capitalism and has facilitated the
advent of the economic crisis.What does that mean?It means, first
of all, that the imperialist war and its aftermath intensified the decay
of capitalism and upset its equilibrium, that we are now living in an epoch
of wars and revolutions, that capitalism has already ceased to be the sole
and all-embracing system of world economy, that side
by side with the capitalist system of economy there is the
socialist system, which is growing, thriving, stands opposed
to the capitalist system and by its very existence demonstrates the decaying
state of capitalism, shakes its foundations.It means, further,
that the imperialist war and. the victory of the revolution in the USSR
have shaken the foundations of imperialism in the colonial and dependent
countries, that the prestige of imperialism has already been undermined
in those countries, that it is no longer able to lord it in those countries
In the old way.It means,
further, that during the war and after it, a young native capitalism appeared
and grew up in the colonial and dependent countries, which is successfully
competing in the markets with the old capitalist countries, intensifying
and complicating the struggle for markets.It means,
lastly, that the war left the majority of capitalist countries a burdensome
heritage in the shape of enterprises chronically working under capacity
and of an army of unemployed numbering millions, which
has been transformed from a reserve into a permanent army of unemployed;
this created for capitalism a mass of difficulties even before the
present economic crisis, and must complicate matters still more during
the crisis.Such are the
circumstances which intensify and aggravate the world economic crisis.It must
be admitted that the present economic crisis is the gravest and most profound
world economic crisis that has ever occurred.A most important
result of the world economic crisis is that it is laying bare and intensifying
the contradictions inherent in world capitalism.a) It is laying
bare and intensifying the contradictions
between the major imperialist countries, the struggle for markets,
the struggle for raw materials, the struggle for the export of capital.
None of the capitalist states is now satisfied with the old distribution
of spheres of influence and colonies. They see that the relation of forces
has changed and that it is necessary in accordance with it to redivide
markets, sources of raw materials, spheres of influence, and so forth.
The chief contradiction here is that between the United States and Britain.
Both in the sphere of the export of manufactured goods and in the sphere
of the export of capital, the struggle is raging chiefly between the United
States and Britain. It is enough to read any journal dealing with economics,
any document concerning exports of goods and capital, to be convinced of
this. The principal arena of the struggle is South America, China, the
colonies and dominions of the old imperialist states. Superiority of forces
in this struggle - and a definite superiority - is on the side of the United
States.After the
chief contradiction come contradictions which, while not the chief ones,
are, however, fairly important: between America and Japan, between Germany
and France, between France and Italy, between Britain and France, and so
forth.There can
be no doubt whatever that owing to the developing crisis, the struggle
for markets, for raw materials and for the export of capital will grow
more intense month by month and day by day.Means of struggle:
tariff policy, cheap goods, cheap credits, regrouping of forces and new
military-political alliances, growth of armaments and preparation for new
I have spoken
about the crisis embracing all branches of production. There is one branch,
however, has not been affected by the crisis. That branch is the armament
industry. It is growing continuously, not-withstanding the crisis. The
bourgeois states are furiously arming and rearming. What for? Not for friendly
chats, of course, but for war. And the imperialists need war, for it is
the only means by which to redivide the world, to redivide markets, sources
of raw materials and spheres for the investment of capital.It is quite
understandable that in this situation so-called pacifism is living its
last days, that the League of Nations is rotting alive, that "disarmament
schemes" come to nothing, while conferences for the reduction of naval
armaments become transformed into conferences for renewing and enlarging
navies.This means that the danger of war
will grow at an accelerated pace.Let the Social-Democrats chatter about
pacifism, peace, the peaceful development of capitalism, and so forth.
The experience of Social-Democrats being in power in Germany and Britain
shows that for them pacifism is only a screen needed to conceal the preparation
for new wars.b) It is laying bare and
will intensify the contradictions between the victor countries and
the vanquished countries. Among the latter I have in mind chiefly
Germany. Undoubtedly, in view of the crisis and the aggravation of the
problem of markets, increased pressure will be brought to bear upon Germany,
which is not only a debtor, but also a very big exporting. country. The
peculiar relations that have developed between the victor countries and
Germany could be depicted in the form of a pyramid at the apex of which
America, France, Britain and the others are seated in lordly fashion, holding
in their hands the Young Plan (Original
Footnote: The Young Plan - named after
its author, the American banker Young - was a plan for exacting reparations
from Germany. It was adopted on June 7, 1929, by a committee of French,
British, Italian, Japanese, Belgian, American and German experts, and was
finally endorsed at the Hague Conference on January 20, 1930. The plan
fixed total German reparations at 113,900 million marks (in foreign currency),
to be paid over a period of 59 years. All reparations receipts and payments
were to be handled by the Bank for International Settlements, in which
the U.S.A. occupied a dominant position. The establishment of this bank
was one of the cardinal points of the Young Plan and was a means by which
American monopoly capital could control the trade and currencies of the
European countries. The plan relieved German industry of contributions
to reparations, the whole burden of which was laid upon the working people.
The Young Plan made it possible to speed up the rebuilding of Germany's
industrial war potential, which the U.S. imperialists were seeking to achieve
with a view to launching aggression against the USSR) with the
inscription: "Pay up!"; while underneath lies Germany, flattened out, exhausting
herself and compelled to exert all her efforts to obey the order to pay
thousands of millions in indemnities. You wish to know what this is? It
is "the spirit of Locarno. (Original Footnote:
This refers to the treaties and agreements concluded by the imperialist
states at a conference in Locarno, Switzerland, held October 5-16, 1925.
The Locarno agreements were designed to strengthen the post-war system
established in Europe by the Treaty of Versailles, but their effect was
to sharpen still more the contradictions between the chief imperialist
countries and to stimulate preparation for new wars. [For the Locarno Conference,
see J. V. Stalin, Works:, Vol. 7, pp. 277-83.]) To think
that such a situation will have no effect upon world capitalism means not
to understand anything in life. To think that the German bourgeoisie will
be able to pay 20,000 million marks within the next ten years and that
the German proletariat, which is living under the double yoke of "its own"
and the "foreign" bourgeoisie, will allow the German bourgeoisie to squeeze
these 20,000 million marks out of it without serious battles and convulsions,
means to go out of one's mind. Let the German and French politicians pretend
that they believe in this miracle. We Bolsheviks do not believe in miracles.c) It is laying
bare and intensifying the contradictions between the imperialist
states and the colonial and dependent countries. The growing economic
crisis cannot but increase the pressure of the imperialists upon the colonies
and dependent countries, which are the chief markets for goods and sources
of raw materials. Indeed, this pressure is increasing to the utmost degree.
It is a fact that the European bourgeoisie is now in a state of war with
"its" colonies in India, Indo-China, Indonesia and North Africa. It is
a fact that "independent" China is already virtually partitioned into spheres
of influence, while the cliques of counter-revolutionary Kuomintang generals,
warring among themselves and ruining the Chinese people, are obeying the
will of their masters in the imperialist camp. The mendacious
story that officials of the Russian embassies in China are to blame for
the disturbance of "peace and order" in China must now be regarded as having
been utterly exposed. There have been no Russian embassies for a long time
in either South or Central China. On the other hand, there are British,
Japanese, German, American and all sorts of other embassies there. There
have been no Russian embassies for a long time in either South or Central
China. On the other hand, there are German, British and Japanese military
advisers with the warring Chinese generals. There have been no Russian
embassies there for a long time. On the other hand, there are British,
American, German, Czechoslovak and all sorts of other guns, rifles, aircraft,
tanks and poison gases. Well? Instead of "peace and order" a most unrestrained
and most devastating war of the generals, financed and instructed by the
"civilised" states of Europe and America, is now raging in South and Central
China. We get a rather piquant picture of the "civilising" activities of
the capitalist states. What we do not understand is merely: what have the
Russian Bolsheviks to do with it?It would be
ridiculous to think that these out-rages will be without consequences for
the imperialists. The Chinese workers and peasants have already retaliated
to them by forming Soviets and a Red Army. It is said that a Soviet government
has already been set up there. I think that if this is true, there is nothing
surprising about it. There can be no doubt that only Soviets can save China
from utter collapse and pauperisation.As regards
India, Indo-China, Indonesia, Africa, etc., the growth of the revolutionary
movement in those countries, which at times assumes the form of a national
war for liberation, leaves no room for doubt. Messieurs the bourgeois count
on flooding those countries with blood and on relying on police bayonets,
calling people like Gandhi to their assistance. There can be no doubt that
police bayonets make a poor prop. Tsarism, in its day, also tried to rely
on police bayonets, but everybody knows what kind of a prop they turned
out to be. As regards assistants of the Gandhi type, tsarism had a whole
herd of them in the shape of liberal compromisers of every kind, but nothing
came of this except discomfiture.d) It is laying
bare and intensifying the contradictions between the bourgeoisie
and the proletariat in the capitalist countries. The crisis has
already increased the pressure exerted by the capitalists on the working
class. The crisis has already given rise to another wave of capitalist
rationalisation, to a further deterioration of the conditions of the working
class, to increased un-employment, to an enlargement of the permanent army
of unemployed, to a reduction of wages. It is not surprising that these
circumstances are revolutionising the situation, intensifying the class
struggle and pushing the workers towards new class battles.As a result
of this, Social-Democratic illusions among the masses of workers are being
shattered and dispelled. After the experience of Social-Democrats being
in power, when they broke strikes, organised lockouts and shot down workers,
the false promises of "industrial democracy, peace in industry," and "peaceful
methods" of struggle sound like cruel mockery to the workers. Will many
workers be found today capable of believing the false doctrines of the
social-fascists? The well-known workers' demonstrations of August 1, 1929
(against the war danger) and of March 6, 1930 (against unemployment) (Original
footnote: Anti-war demonstrations and strikes on August 1, 1929 (the
fifteenth anniversary of the outbreak of the imperialist first world war)
and protest demonstrations on March 8, 1930, against the rapid growth of
unemployment (as a result of the world economic crisis of 1929) took place
in many cities and industrial centres of France, Germany, Britain, the
U.S.A., Poland and other European and American countries. The protest movement
took place wholly under the leadership of the Communist Parties and the
Communist International) show that the best members of the working
class have already turned away from the social-fascists. The economic crisis
will strike a fresh blow at Social-Democratic illusions among the workers.
Not many workers will be found now, after the bankruptcies and ruination
caused by the crisis, who believe that it is possible for "every worker"
to become rich by holding shares in "democratised" joint-stock companies.
Needless to say, the crisis will strike a crushing blow at all these and
similar illusions.The desertion
of the masses of the workers from the Social-Democrats, however, signifies
a turn on their part towards communism. That is what is actually taking
place. The growth of the trade-union movement that is associated with the
Communist Party, the electoral successes of the Communist Parties, the
wave of strikes in which the Communists are taking a leading part, the
development of economic strikes into political protests organised by the
Communists, the mass demonstrations of workers who sympathise with communism,
which are meeting a lively response in the working class - all this shows
that the masses of the workers regard the Communist Party as the only party
capable of fighting capitalism, the only party worthy of the workers' confidence,
the only party under whose leadership it is possible to enter, and worth
while entering, the struggle for emancipation from capitalism. This means
that the masses are turning towards communism. It is the guarantee that
our fraternal Communist Par-ties will become big mass parties of the working
class. All that is necessary is that the Communists should be capable of
appraising the situation and making proper use of it. By developing an
uncompromising struggle against Social-Democracy, which is capital's agency
in the working class, and by reducing to dust all and sundry deviations
from Leninism, which bring grist to the mill of Social-Democracy, the Communist
Parties have shown that they are on the right road. They must definitely
fortify themselves on this road; for only if they do that can they count
on winning over the majority of the working class and successfully prepare
the proletariat for the coming class battles. Only if they do that can
we count on a further increase in the influence and prestige of the Communist
International.Such is the
state of the principal contradictions of world capitalism, which have become
intensified to the utmost by the world economic crisis.What do all
these facts show?That the stabilisation
of capitalism is coming to an end.That the upsurge
of the mass revolutionary movement will increase with fresh vigour.That in a
number of countries the world economic crisis will grow into a political
crisis.This means,
firstly, that the bourgeoisie will seek a way out of the situation through
further fascisation in the sphere of domestic policy, and will utilise
all the reactionary forces, including Social-Democracy, for this purpose.It means,
secondly, that in the sphere of foreign policy the bourgeoisie will seek
a way out through a new imperialist war.It means,
lastly, that the proletariat, in fighting capitalist exploitation and the
war danger, will seek a way out through revolution.a) I have spoken
above about the contradictions of world capitalism. In addition to these,
however, there is one other contradiction. I am referring to the contradiction
between the capitalist world and the USSR
True, this contradiction must not be regarded as being of the same
order as the contradiction
within capitalism. It is a contradiction
between capitalism as a whole and the country that is building socialism.
This, however, does not prevent it from corroding and shaking the very
foundations of capitalism. More than that, it lays bare all the contradictions
of capitalism to the roots and gathers them into a single knot, transforming
them into an issue of the life and death of the capitalist order itself.
That is why, every time the contradictions of capitalism become acute,
the bourgeoisie turns its gaze towards the USSR, wondering whether
it would not be possible to solve this or that contradiction of capitalism,
or all the contradictions together, at the expense of the USSR, of
that Land of Soviets, that citadel of revolution which, by its very existence,
is revolutionising the working class and the colonies, which is hindering
the organisation of a new war, hindering a new redivision of the world,
hindering the capitalists from lording it in its extensive home market
which they need so much, especially now, in view of the economic crisis.Hence the
tendency towards adventurist attacks on the USSR and towards intervention,
a tendency which will certainly grow owing to the development of the economic
crisis.The most striking
expression of this tendency at the present time is present-day bourgeois
France, the birthplace of the philanthropic "Pan-Europe"(Original
Footnote: '"Pan-Europe "-a projected bloc of European states against
the Soviet Union suggested by the French Foreign Minister Briand in May
1930. Europe, united in a Federal Union," was to constitute a single anti-Soviet
front, and the executive body of the "Federal Union," the "European Committee,"
was to be a general staff for preparing an attack on the USSR Briand's
plan was also designed to establish French hegemony on the European
continent, and therefore encountered the opposition of Britain, Italy and
the U.S.A. Nothing came of the "Pan-Europe" scheme owing to the contradictions
between the imperialist powers) scheme, the "cradle" of the Kellogg
Pact, (Original footnote: This refers to the
pact renouncing war signed in Paris on August 27, 1928, by the U.S.A.,
France, Germany, Great Britain, Poland, Italy, Japan, Czechoslovakia, Belgium
and the British Dominions. The USSR was not invited to take part in
the negotiations for the conclusion of the Kellogg Pact, in order that
the USSR should not be included among the countries to which the proposed
pact for renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should
apply. Under cover of demagogic talk about "universal peace," the sponsors
of the pact (France, U.S.A., Britain) intended to use it as a means of
isolating and combating the USSR The true purposes of the pact were
exposed by the Government of the USSR in its statement of August 5,
1925. Under the pressure of public opinion, the American, British and French
Governments were compelled to invite the USSR to adhere to the pact.
The Soviet Government did so and was one of the first to ratify the Kellogg
Pact, inviting neighbouring states to conclude an agreement giving immediate
effect to its provisions. Such an agreement was signed by the USSR,
Poland, Rumania, Estonia and Latvia in Moscow on February 9, 1929, Turkey
and Lithuania adhering to it later) the most aggressive and militarist
of all the aggressive and militarist countries in the world.But intervention
is a two-edged sword. The bourgeoisie knows this perfectly well. It will
be all right, it thinks, if intervention goes off smoothly and ends in
the defeat of the USSR But what if it ends in the defeat of the capitalists?
There was intervention once and it ended in failure. If the first intervention,
when the Bolsheviks were weak, ended in failure, what guarantee is there
that the second will not end in failure too? Everybody sees that the Bolsheviks
are far stronger now, both economically and politically, and as regards
preparedness for the country's defence. And what about the workers in the
capitalist countries, who will not permit intervention in the USSR,
who will fight intervention and, if anything happens, may attack the capitalists
in the rear? Would it not be better to proceed along the line of increasing
trade connections with the USSR, to which the Bolsheviks do not object?Hence the
tendency towards continuing peaceful relations with the USSR.Thus, we have
two sets of factors, and two different tendencies operating in opposite
directions:1) The policy
of disrupting economic connections between the USSR and the capitalist
countries; provocative attacks upon the USSR; open and secret activities
in preparation for intervention against the USSR These are the factors
that menace the USSR's international position. It is the operation
of these factors that explains such facts as the rupture of relations with
the USSR by the British Conservative Cabinet; the seizure of the Chinese-Eastern
Railway by the Chinese militarists; the financial blockade of the USSR;
the clerical "crusade," headed by the Pope, against the USSR; the organisation
by agents of foreign states of wrecking activities on the part of our specialists;
the organisation of explosions and incendiarism, such as were carried out
by certain employees of "Lena Gold-Fields (Original
Footnotes: Lena Gold-Fields - a British company which in 1925-30 held
a concession in the USSR for the exploitation of gold, copper, iron
and other deposits in Siberia. By the terms of the concession agreement
the Lena Gold-Fields company was obliged to construct new mining enterprises
and to reconstruct the plants and mines it had received on lease. In view
of the fact that the company did not carry out its obligations and caused
the plants, mines and other installations it had received to fall into
decay, the Soviet Government terminated the concession and committed to
trial Lena Gold-Fields employees who had engaged in espionage and wrecking
activities in the USSR); attempts on the lives of representatives
of the USSR (Poland); finding fault with our exports (United States,
Poland), and so forth.2) Sympathy towards and support of the USSR on the part of the workers
in capitalist countries; growth of the economic and political might of
the USSR; increase in the USSRís defence capacity; the peace policy
undeviatingly pursued by the Soviet government. These are the factors that
strengthen the USSR's international position. It is the operation of
these factors that explains such facts as the successful settlement of
the dispute over the Chinese-Eastern Railway, the restoration of relations
with Britain, the growth of economic connections with capitalist countries,
and so forth.It is the conflict between these factors that determines
the USSRís external situation.b) It is said
that the stumbling block to the improvement of economic relations between
the USSR and the bourgeois states is the question of the debts. I think
that this is not an argument in favour of paying the debts, but a pretext
advanced by the aggressive elements for interventionist propaganda. Our
policy in this field is clear and well-grounded. On condition that we are
granted credits, we are willing to pay a small part of the pro-war debts,
regarding them as additional interest on the credits. Without this condition
we cannot and must not pay. Is more demanded of us? On what grounds? Is
it not well-known that those debts were contracted by the tsarist government,
which was overthrown by the Revolution, and for whose obligations the Soviet
Government can take no responsibility? There is talk about international
law, about international obligations. But on the grounds of what international
law did Messieurs the "Allies" sever Bessarabia from the USSR and hand
it over to enslavement under the Rumanian boyars? On the grounds of what
international obligations did the capitalists and governments of France,
Britain, America and Japan attack the USSR, invade it, and for three
whole years plunder it and ruin its inhabitants? If this is what is called
international law and international obligations, then what will you call
robbery? (Laughter. Applause.) Is it not obvious that by committing
these predatory acts Messieurs the "Allies" have deprived themselves of
the right to appeal to international law, to international obligations?It is said,
further, that the establishment of "normal" relations is hindered by the
propaganda conducted by the Russian Bolsheviks. With the object of preventing
the pernicious effects of propaganda, Messieurs the bourgeois every now
and again fence themselves off with "cordons" and "barbed-wire fences"
and graciously bestow the honour of guarding these "fences" upon Poland,
Rumania, Finland and others. It is said that Germany is burning with envy
because she is not being permitted to guard the "cordons" and "barbed-wire
fences." Does it need to be proved that the chatter about propaganda is
no argument against establishing "normal relations," but a pretext for
interventionist propaganda? How can people who do not want to appear ridiculous
"fence themselves off" from the ideas of Bolshevism if in their own country
there exists favourable soil for these ideas? Tsarism in its time also
"fenced itself off" from Bolshevism, but, as is well known, the "fence"
proved to be useless. It proved to be useless because Bolshevism everywhere
does not penetrate from outside, but grows within the country. There are
no countries, one would think, more "fenced-off" from the Russian Bolsheviks
than China, India and Indo-China. But what do we find? Bolshevism is growing
in these countries, and will continue to grow, in spite of all "cordons,"
because, evidently, there are conditions there that are favourable for
Bolshevism. What has the propaganda of the Russian Bolsheviks to do with
it? If Messieurs the capitalists could somehow "fence themselves off" from
the economic crisis, from mass poverty, from unemployment, from low wages
and from the exploitation of labour, it would be another matter; then there
would be no Bolshevik movement in their countries. But the whole point
is that every rascal tries to justify his weakness or impotence by pleading
Russian Bolshevik propaganda.It is said,
further, that another stumbling block is our Soviet system, collectivisation,
the fight against the kulaks, anti-religious propaganda, the fight against
wreckers and counter-revolutionaries among "men of science," the banishment
of the Besedovskys, Solomons, Dmitrievskys, and other lackeys of capital.
But this is becoming quite amusing. It appears that they don't like the
Soviet system. But we don't like the capitalist system. (Laughter. Applause.)
We don't like the fact that in their countries tens of millions of
unemployed are compelled to suffer poverty and starvation, while a small
group of capitalists own wealth amounting to billions. Since, however,
we have agreed not to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries,
is it not obvious that it is not worth while reverting to this question?
Collectivisation, the fight against the kulaks, the fight against wreckers,
anti-religious propaganda, and so forth, are the inalienable right of the
workers and peasants of the USSR, sealed by our Constitution. We must
and shall implement the Constitution of the USSR with complete consistency.
Naturally, therefore, whoever refuses to reckon with our Constitution can
pass on, can go wherever he pleases. As for the Besedovskys, Solomons,
Dmitrievskys and so forth, we shall continue to throw out such people like
defective goods that are useless and harmful for the Revolution. Let them
be made heroes of by those who have a special predilection for offal. (Laughter.)
The millstones of our Revolution grind exceedingly well. They take
all that is useful and give it to the Soviets and cast aside the offal.
It is said that in France, among the Parisian bourgeois, there is a big
demand for these defective goods. Well, let them import them to their heart's
content. True, this will overburden somewhat the import side of France's
balance of trade, against which Messieurs the bourgeois always protest,
but that is their business. Let us not intervene in the internal affairs
of France. (Laughter. Applause.)That is how
the matter stands with the "obstacles" that hinder the establishment of
"normal" relations between the USSR and other countries.It turns out
that these "obstacles" are fictitious "obstacles" raised as a pretext for
anti-Soviet propaganda.Our policy
is a policy of peace and of increasing trade connections with all countries.
A result of this policy is an improvement in our relations with a number
of countries and the conclusion of a number of agreements for trade', technical
assistance, and so forth. Another result is the USSRís adherence to
the Kellogg Pact, the signing of the well-known protocol along the lines
of the Kellogg Pact with Poland, Rumania, Lithuania, and other countries,
the signing of the protocol on the prolongation of the treaty of friendship
and neutrality with Turkey. And lastly, a result of this policy is the
fact that we have succeeded in maintaining peace, in not allowing our enemies
to draw us into conflicts, in spite of a number of provocative acts and
adventurist attacks on the part of the warmongers. We shall continue to
pursue this policy of peace with all our might and with all the means at
our disposal. We do not want a single foot of foreign territory; but of
our territory we shall not surrender a single inch to anyone. (Applause.)Such is our
foreign policy.
The task is
to continue this policy with all the perseverance characteristic of Bolsheviks.
Let us pass to the internal situation in the USSR
 In contrast to
the capitalist countries, where an economic crisis and growing
unemployment reign, the internal situation in our country presents
a picture of increasing advance of the national economy and
of progressive diminution of unemployment. Large-scale industry
has grown up, and the rate of its development has increased. Heavy industry
has become firmly established. The socialist sector of industry has made
great headway. A new force has arisen in agriculture - the state farms
and collective farms. Whereas a year or two ago we had a crisis in grain
production, and in our grain-procurement operations we depended mainly
on individual farming, now the centre of gravity has shifted to the collective
farms and state farms, and the grain crisis can be regarded as having been,
in the main, solved. The main mass of the peasantry has definitely turned
towards the collective farms. The resistance of the kulaks has been broken.
The internal situation in the USSR has been still further consolidated.
Such is the general picture of the internal situation
in the USSR at the present time.Let us examine the concrete facts.a) In 1926-27,
i.e., at the time of the Fifteenth Congress of the Party, the gross output
of agriculture as a whole, including forestry, fishing, etc.,
amounted in pro-war rubles to 12,370,000,000 rubles, i.e., 106.6 per cent
of the pro-war level. In the following year, however, i.e., in 1927-28,
it was 107.2 per cent, in 1928-29 it was 109.1 per cent, and this year,
1929-30, judging by the course of development of agriculture, it will be
not less than 113-114 per cent of the pre-war level.Thus we have
a steady, although relatively slow, increase in agricultural production
as a whole.In 1926-27,
i.e., at the time of the Fifteenth Congress of the Party, the gross output
of industry as a whole, both small and large scale, including
flour milling, amounted in pro-war rubles to 8,641,000,000 rubles, i.e.,
102.5 per cent of the pre-war level. In the following year, however, i.e.,
in 1927-28, it was 122 per cent, in 1928-29 it was 142.5 per cent, and
this year, 1929-30, judging by the course of industrial development, it
will be not less than 180 per cent of the pro-war level.Thus we have
an unprecedentedly rapid growth of industry as a whole.b) In 1926-27,
i.e., at the time of the Fifteenth Congress of the Party, freight
turnover on our entire railway system amounted to
81,700,000,000 ton-kilometers, i.e., 127 per cent of the prewar level.
In the following year, however, i.e., in 1927-28 it was 134.2 per cent,
in 1928-29 it was 162.4 per cent, and this year, 1929-30, it, by all accounts,
will be not less than 193 per cent of the pre-war level. As regards new
railway construction, in the period under review, i.e., counting from 1927-28,
the railway system has grown from 76,000 kilometers to 80,000 kilometers,
which is 136.7 per cent of the pro-war level.c) If we take
the trade turnover (wholesale and retail) in the country
in 1926-27 as 100 (31,000,000,000 'rubles), then the volume of trade in
1927-28 shows an increase to 124.6 per cent, that in 1928-29 to 160.4 per
cent, and this year, 1929-30, the volume of trade will, by all accounts,
reach 202 per cent, i.e., double that of 1926-27.d) If we take
the combined balances of all our credit institutions
on October 1, 1927 as 100 (9,173,000,000 rubles), then on October 1, 1928,
there was an increase to 141 per cent, and on October 1, 1929, an increase
to 201.1 per cent, i.e., an amount double that of 1927.e) If the combined
state budget for 1926-27 is taken as 100 (6,371,000,000 rubles)
that for 1927-28 shows an increase to 125.5 per cent, that for 1928-29
an increase to 146.7 per cent, and that for 1929-30 to 204.4 per cent,
i.e., double the budget for 1926-27 (12,605,000,000 rubles).f) In 1926-27,
our foreign trade turnover (exports and imports) was 47.9
per cent of the pre-war level. In 1927-28, however, our foreign trade turnover
rose to 56.8 per cent, in 1928-29 to 67.9 per cent, and in 1929-30 it,
by all accounts, will be not less than 80 per cent of the pre-war level.g) As a result,
we have the following picture of the growth of the total national
income during the period under review (in 1926-27 prices): in 1926-27,
the national income, according to the data of the State Planning Commission,
amounted to 23,127,000,000 rubles; in 1927-28 it amounted to 25,396,000,000
rubles, an increase of 9.8 per cent; in 1928-29 it amounted to 28,596,000,000
rubles - an increase of 12.6 per cent; in 1929-30 the national income ought,
by all accounts, to amount to not less than 34,000,000,000 rubles, thus
showing an increase for the year of 20 per cent. The average annual increase
during the three years under review is, therefore, over 15 per cent. Bearing in
mind that the average annual increase in the national income in countries
like the United States, Britain and Germany amounts to no more than 3-8
per cent, it must be admitted that the rate of increase of the national
income of the USSR is truly a record one.Our national economy
is growing not spontaneously, but in a definite direction, namely, in the
direction of industrialisation; its keynote is: industrialisation, growth
of the relative importance of industry in the general system of the national
economy, transformation of our country from an agrarian into an industrial
country.a) The dynamics
of the relation between industry as a whole and agriculture as a whole
from the point of view of the relative importance of industry in the gross
output of the entire national economy during the period under review
takes the following form: in pre-war times, industry's share of the gross
output of the national economy was 42.1 per cent and that of agriculture
57.9 per cent; in 1927-28 industry's share was 45.2 per cent and that of
agriculture 54.8 per cent; in 1928-29, industry's share was 48.7 per cent
and that of agriculture 51.3 per cent; in 1929-30 industry's share ought
to, by all accounts, be, not less than 53 per cent and that of agriculture
not more than 47 per cent. This means
that the relative importance of industry is already beginning to surpass
the relative importance of agriculture in the general system of national
economy, and that we are on the eve of the transformation of our country
from an agrarian into an industrial country.
(Applause.)b) There is
a still more marked preponderance in favour of industry when regarded from
the viewpoint of its relative importance in the commodity output
of the national economy. In 1926-27, industry's share of the total commodity
output of the national economy was 68.8 per cent and that of agriculture
31.2 per cent. In 1927-28, however, industry's share was 71.2 per cent
and that of agriculture 28.8 per cent; in 1928-29 industry's share was
72.4 per cent and that of agriculture 27.6 per cent, and in 1929-30, industry's
share will, by all accounts, be 76 per cent and that of agriculture 24
per cent. This particularly
unfavourable position of agriculture is due, among other things, to its
character as small-peasant and small-commodity agriculture. Naturally,
this situation should change to a certain extent as large-scale agriculture
develops through the state farms and collective farms and produces more
for the market.c) The development
of industry in general, however, does not give a complete picture of the
rate of industrialisation. To obtain a complete picture we must also ascertain
the dynamics of the relation between heavy industry and light industry.
Hence, the most striking index of the growth of industrialisation must
be considered to be the progressive growth of the relative importance of
the output of instruments and means of production (heavy
industry) in the total industrial output. In 1927-28, the share of output
of instruments and means of production in the total output of all
industry amounted to 27.2 per cent while that of the output of consumer
goods was 72.8 per cent. In 1928-29, however, the share of the output of
instruments and means of production amounted to 28.7 per cent as against
71.3 per cent, and in 1929-30, the share of the output of instruments and
means of production, will, by all accounts, already amount to 32.7 per
cent as against 67.3 per cent.If, however,
we take not all industry, but only that part which is planned
by the Supreme Council of National Economy, and which embraces all the
main branches of industry, the relation between the output of instruments
and means of production and the output of consumer goods will present a
still more favourable picture, namely: in 1927-28, the share of the output
of instruments and means of production amounted to 42.7 per cent as against
57.3 per cent; 1928-29 - 44.6 per cent as against 55.4 per cent, and in1929-30,
it will, by all accounts, amount to not less than 48 per cent as against
52 per cent for the output of consumer goods.The keynote
of the development of our national economy is industrialisation, the strengthening
and development of our own heavy industry.This means
that we have already established and are further developing our heavy industry,
the basis of our economic independence.The keynote of
the development of our national economy is industrialisation. But we do
not need just any of industrialisation. We need the kind of industrialisation
of that will ensure the growing preponderance the socialist forms
of industry over the capitalist forms of industry. The characteristic
feature of our industrialisation is that it is socialist industrialisation
an industrialisation which guarantees the victory of the socialised
sector of industry, over the private sector, over the
small-commodity and capitalist sector.Here are some
data on the growth of capital investment and of gross output according
to sectors: a) Taking the growth of capital investments
in industry according to sectors, we get the following
picture.Socialised sector: 
In 1926-27 — 1,270,000,000 rubles; 
in 1927-28 —1,614,000,000 rubles; 
in 1928-29 — 2,046,000,000 rubles; 
in 1929-30 — 4,275,000,000 rubles.Private and capitalist sector: 
in 1926-27 — 63,000,000 rubles; 
in 1927-28 — 64,000,000 rubles; 
in 1928-29 — 56,000,000 rubles; 
in 1929-30 — 51,000,000 rubles.This means, firstly, that
during this period capital investments in the socialised sector of industry
have more than trebled (335 per cent).It means, secondly, that
during this period capital investments in the private and capitalist sector
have been reduced by one-fifth (81 per cent).The private and capitalist
sector is living on its old capital and is moving towards its doom.b) Taking the growth of
gross output of industry according to sectors we get the
following picture.Socialised sector: 
in 1926-27 — 11,999,000,000 rubles; 
in 1927-28 — 15,389,000,000 rubles; 
in 1928-29 — 18,903,000,000 rubles; 
in 1929-30 — 24,740,000,000 rubles.Private and capitalist
sector: 
in 1926-27 — 4,043,000,000 rubles; 
in 1927-28 — 3,704,000,000 rubles; 
in 1928-29 — 3,389,000,000 rubles; 
in 1929-30 — 3,310,000,000 rubles.This means, firstly, that
during the three years, the gross output of the socialised sector of industry
more than doubled (206.2 per cent).It means, secondly, that
in the same period the gross industrial output of the private and capitalist
sector was reduced by nearly one-fifth (81.9 per
cent).If, however, we take the
output not of all industry, but only of large-scale (statistically
registered) industry and examine it according to sectors, we get the following
picture of the relation between the socialised and private sectors.Relative importance of
the socialised sector in the output of the country's large-scale
industry: 
1926-27 — 97.7 per cent; 
1927-28 — 98.6 per cent; 
1928-29 — 99.1 per cent; 
1929-30 — 99.3 per cent.Relative importance of
the private sector in the output of the country's large-scale industry: 
1926-27 — 2.3 per cent;
1927-28 — 1.4 per cent;
1928-29 — 0.9 per cent;
1929-30 — 0.7 per cent.As you see, the capitalist
elements in large-scale industry have already gone to the bottom.Clearly, the question
"who will beat whom," the question whether socialism will defeat the capitalist
elements in industry, or whether the latter will defeat socialism, has
already been settled in favour of the socialist forms of industry. Settled
finally and irrevocably. (Applause.)c) Particularly interesting are the data on the rate of development
during the period under review of state industry that
is planned by the Supreme Council of National Economy. If the 1926-27 gross
output of socialist industry planned by the Supreme Council of National
Economy is taken as 100, the 1927-28 gross output of that industry shows
a rise to 127.4 percent, that of 1928-29 to 158.6 and that of 1929-30 wi1l
show a rise to 209.8 per per cent.
This means that socialist industry planned by the-Supreme Council of National
Economy, comprising all the main branches of industry and the whole of
heavy industry, has more than doubled during the three years.
It cannot but be admitted that no other country in the world can show such
a terrific rate of development of its large-scale industry.
This circumstance gives us grounds for speaking of the five-year plan in
four years.
d) Some comrades are sceptical about the slogan "the five-year plan
in four years." Only very recently one section of comrades regarded
our five-year plan, which was endorsed by the Fifth Congress of Soviets,
(Original Footnote: The Fifth Congress
of Soviets of the USSR, which was held In Moscow, May 2028, 1929, discussed
the following questions: The report of the Government of the USSR;
the five-year plan of development of the national economy of the USSR;
the promotion of agriculture and the development of co-operation in the
countryside. The central question at the congress was the discussion and
adoption of the First Stalin Five Year Plan. The congress approved the
report of the Government of the USSR, endorsed the five-year plan of
development of the national economy, outlined ways and means of promoting
agriculture and the development of co-operatives in the countryside, and
elected a new Central Executive Committee of the USSR) as fantastic; not to mention the bourgeois writers whose
eyes pop out of their heads at the very words "five-year plan." But what
is the actual situation if we consider the fulfillment of the five-year
plan during the first two years? What does checking the fulfilment of the
optimal variant of the five-year plan tell us? It tells us not only that
we can carry out the five-year plan in four years, it also tells us that
in a number of branches of industry we can carry it out in three and even
in two-and-a-half years. This may sound incredible to the sceptics in the
opportunist camp, but it is a fact, which it would be foolish, and ridiculous
to deny.Judge for yourselves.According
to the five-year plan, the output of the oil industry in
1932-33 was to amount to 977,000,000 rubles. Actually, its output already
in 1929-30 amounts to 809,000,000 rubles, i.e., 83 per cent of the amount
fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. Thus, we are fulfilling the five-year
plan for the oil industry in a matter of two-and-a-half years.The output
of the peat industry in 1932-33, according to the five-year
plan, was to amount to 122,000,000 rubles. Actually, in 1919-30 already
its output amounts to over 115,000,000 rubles, i.e., 96 per cent of the
output fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. Thus, we are fulfilling
the five-year plan for the peat industry in two-and-a-half years, if not
sooner.According
to the five-year plan, the output of the general machine-building
industry in 1932-33 was to amount to 2,058,000,000 rubles. Actually,
in 1929-30 already its output amounts to 1,458,000,000 rubles, i.e., 70
per cent of the output fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. Thus, we
are fulfilling the five-year plan for the general machine-building industry
in two-and-a-half years.According
to the five-year plan, the output of the agricultural machine-building
industry in 1932-33 was to amount to 610,000,000 rubles. Actually,
in 1929-30, already its output amounts to 400,000 000 rubles, i.e., over
60 per cent of the amount fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. Thus,
we are fulfilling the agricultural machine-building industry in three years,
if not sooner.According
to the five-year plan, the output of the electro-technical industry
in 1932-33 was to amount to 896,000,000 rubles. Actually in 1929-30
already it amounts to 503,00,000 rubles, i.e.; over 56 per cent of the
amount fixed for 1932-33. Thus, we are fulfilling the five-year plan the
five-year plan for the electro-technical industry in three years.Such are the
unprecedented rates of development of our socialist industries.We are going
forward at an accelerated pace, technically and economically overtaking
the advanced capitalist countries.e) This does
not mean of course, that we have already overtaken them as regards size
of output, that our industry has already reached the level of
the development of industry in the advanced capitalist countries. No, this
is far from being the case. The rate of industrial development
must not be confused with the level of industrial development.
Many people in our country confuse the two and believe that since we have
achieved an unprecedented rate of industrial development we have thereby
reached the level of industrial development of the advanced capitalist
countries. But that is radically wrong.Take, for
example, the, production of electricity, in regard to which our rate of
development is very high. From 1924 to 1929 we achieved an increase in
the output of electricity to nearly 600 per cent of the 1924 figure, whereas
in the same period the output of electricity in the United States increased
only to 181 per cent, in Canada to 218 per cent, in Germany to 241 per
cent and in Italy to 222 per cent. As you see, our rate is truly unprecedented
and exceeds that of all other states. But if we take the level of development
of electricity production in those countries, in 1929, for example, and
compare it with the level of development in the USSR, we shall get
a picture that is far from comforting for the USSR Notwithstanding
the unprecedented rate of development of electricity production in the
USSR, in 1929 output amounted to only 6,465,000,000 kilowatt-hours,
whereas that of the United States amounted to 126,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours,
Canada 17,628,000,000 kilowatt-hours, Germany 33,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours,
and Italy 10,850,000,000 kilowatt-hours. The difference, as you see, is
colossal.It follows,
then, that as regards level of development we are behind all these states.Or take, for
example, our output of pig-iron. If our output of pig-iron for 1926-27
is taken as 100 (2,900,000 tons), the output for the three years from 1927-28
to 1929-30 shows an increase to almost double, to 190 per
cent (5,500,000 tons). The rate of development, as you see, is fairly high.
But if we look at it from the point of view of the level of development
of pig-iron production in our country and compare the size of the output
in the USSR with that in the advanced capitalist countries, the result
is not very comforting. To begin with, we are reaching and shall exceed
the pre-war level of pig-iron production only this year 1929-30. This alone
drives us to the inexorable conclusion that unless we still further accelerate
the development of our metallurgical industry we run the risk of jeopardising
our entire industrial production. As regards the level of development of
the pig4ron industry in our country and in the West we have the following
picture: the output of pig-iron in 1929 in the United States amounted to
42,300,000 tons; Germany ñ 13,400,000 tons; in France ñ 10,450,000 tons;
in Great Britain ñ 7,700,000 tons; but in the USSR the output of pig-iron
at the end of 1929 30 will amount to only 5,500,000 tons.No small difference, as you see. It follows,
therefore, that as regards level of development of pig-iron production
we are behind all these countries.What does all this show?
It shows that:1) The rate
of development of industry must not be confused with
its level of development;2) We are damnably
behind the advanced capitalist countries as regards level
of development of industry;3) Only the
further acceleration of the development of our industry will
enable us to overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries technically
and economically;4) People who
talk about the necessity of reducing the rate of development
of our industry are enemies of socialism, agents of our class enemies.
(Applause.)Above I spoke about the state of agriculture as a whole, including forestry,
fishing, etc,, without dividing agriculture into its main branches If we
separate agriculture as a whole into its main branches, such as, for example,
grain production, livestock farming and the production of industrial crops,
the situation, according to the data of the State Planning Commission and
the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR is seen to be
as follows:
a) If the grain crop area in 1913 is taken
as 100, we get the following picture of the change of the grain crop area
from year to year: 
1926-27 — 
96.9 per cent;  
1927-28 — 
94.7 per cent;  
1928-29 — 
98.2 per cent;  
and this year,
1929-30, the crop area will, by all accounts, be 105.1 per cent of the
pre-war level.
Noticeable is the drop in the grain crop area in 1927-28.
This drop is to be explained not by a retrogression of grain farming such
as the ignoramuses in the Right opportunist camp have been chattering about,
but by the failure of the winter crop on an area of 7,700,000 hectares
(20 per cent of the winter crop area in the USSR).If, further, the gross output of grain
in 1913 is taken as 100, we get the following picture:
1927 — 91.9 per cent; 
1928 — 90.8 per cent; 
1929 — 94.4 per cent, 
and in 1930 we shall, by all accounts, reach 110 per cent of the pre-war
standard.
Noticeable here, too, is the drop in the gross output
put of grain in 1928 due to the failure of the winter crop in the Ukraine
and the North Caucasus.As regards the marketable part of the gross
output of grain (grain sold outside the rural districts),
we have a still mere instructive picture. If the marketable part of the
grain output of 1913 is taken as 100, then the marketable output: 
in 1927 is found to be 31 per cent, 
in 1928 — 36.8 per cent, 
in 1929 — 58 per cent,
and this year, 1930, it will, by all accounts, amount
to not less than 73 per cent of the pre-war level.
It follows, that, as regards grain crop area and gross grain
output, we are reaching the pre-war level and slighlty exceeding it only
this year, 1928.Thus it follows,
further, that, as regards the marketable part of the grain
output we are still far from having reached the pre-war standard and shall
remain below it this year too by about 25 per cent.That is the basis of our grain difficulties, which became
particularly acute in 1928.That, too, is the basis grain problem.b) The picture
is approximately the same, but with more alarming figures, in the sphere
of livestock farming. If the number of all kinds of head
of livestock in 1916 is taken as 100, we get the following picture for
the respective years:In 1927 the number of horses amounted to 88.9 per cent of the pre-war level; 
Large horned-cattle — 114.3 per cent; 
Sheep and goats — 119.3 per cent; 
Pigs — 113.4 per cent.In 1928: 
horses — 94.6 percent; 
large horned cattle — 118.5 per cent; 
sheep and goats — 126 per cent; 
pigs — 126.1 per cent.In 1929: 
horses — 96.9 per cent; 
large horned cattle — 115.6 per cent; 
sheep and goats — 127.8 per cent; 
pigs — 103 per cent.In 1930: 
horses — 88.6 per cent; 
large horned cattle — 89.1 per cent; 
sheep and goats — 87.1 per cent; 
pigs — 60.1 per cent of the 1916 standard.As you see, if we take the figures for the last year
into consideration, we have obvious signs of the beginning of a decline
in livestock farming.The picture is still less comforting from the stand-point
of the marketable output of livestock farming, particularly
as regards meat and pork fat. If we take the gross output of meat and pork
fat for each year as 100, the marketable output of these two items will
be: 
in 1926 — 33.4 per cent; 
in 1927 — 32.9 per cent; 
in 1928 — 30.4 per cent; 
in 1929 — 29.2 per cent.Thus, we have
obvious signs of the instability and economic unreliability of small livestock
farming which produces little for the market.It follows
that instead of exceeding the 1916 standard in livestock farming we have
in the past year obvious signs of a drop below this standard.Thus, after
the grain problem, which we are already solving in the main successfully,
we are faced with the meat problem, the acuteness of which is already making
itself felt, and which is still awaiting solution.c) A different
picture is revealed by the development of industrial crops,
which provide the raw materials for our light industry. If the industrial
crop area in 1913 is taken as 100, we have the following:Cotton,
in 1927 — 107.1 per cent; 
in 1928 — 131.4 per cent; 
in 1929 — 151.4 per cent; 
in 1930 — 217 per cent of the pre-war cent level.Flax,
in 1927 — 86.6 per cent; 
in 1928 — 95.7 per cent; 
in 1929 — 112.9 per cent; 
in 1930 — 125 per cent of the pre-war level.Sugar-beet,
in 1927 — 106.6 per cent; 
in 1928 — 124.2 per cent; 
in 1929 — 125.8 per cent; 
in 1930 — 169 per cent of the pre-war level.Oil crops,
in 1927 — 179.4 per cent; 
in 1928 — 230.9 per cent; 
in 1929 — 219.7 per cent; 
in 1930 — no less than 260 per cent of the pre-war level.The same, in the main, favourable picture is presented by
the gross output of industrial crops. If the gross output
in 1913 is taken as 100, we get the following:cotton, 
in 1928 — 110.5 per cent; 
in 1929 — 119 per cent; 
in 1930 we shall have, by all accounts, 182.8 per cent 
of the pre-war level.Flax, 
in 1928 — 71.6 per cent; 
in 1929 — 81.5 per cent; 
in 1930 we shall have, by all accounts, 101.3 per cent of the pre-war level.Sugar-beet, 
in 1928 — 93 per cent; 
in 1929 — 58 per cent; 
in 1930 we shall have, by all accounts, 139.4 per cent of the pro-war level.Oil crops, 
in 1928 — 161.9 per cent;
in 1929 — 149.8 per cent;
in 1930 we shall have, by all accounts, 220 per cent of the pre-war level.As regards industrial
crops, we thus have a more favourable picture, if we leave out of account
the 1929 beet crop, which was damaged by moths.Incidentally,
here too, in the sphere of industrial crops, serious fluctuations and signs
of instability are possible and probable in the future in view of the predominance
of small farming, similar to the fluctuations and signs of instability
that are demonstrated by the figures for flax and oil crops, which come
least under the influence of the collective farms and state farms.We are thus faced with the following problems in agriculture:1) the problem of strengthening the position of industrial
crops by supplying the districts concerned with sufficient quantities of
cheap grain produce;2) the problem of raising the level of livestock farming
and of solving the meat question by supplying the districts concerned with
sufficient quantities of cheap grain produce and fodder;3) the problem of finally solving the question of grain
farming as the chief question in agriculture at the present moment.
 It follows that
the grain problem is the main link in the system of agriculture and the
key to the solution of all the other problems in agriculture.It follows
that the solution of the grain problem is the first in order of a number
of problems in agriculture.But solving
the grain problem, and so putting agriculture on the road to really big
progress, means completely doing away with the backwardness of agriculture;
it means equipping it with tractors and agricultural machines, supplying
it with new cadres of scientific workers, raising the productivity of labour,
and increasing the output for the market. Unless these conditions are fulfilled,
it is impossible even to dream of solving the grain problem.Is it possible
to fulfil all these conditions on the basis of small, individual peasant
farming? No, it is impossible. It is impossible because small-peasant farming
is unable to accept and master new technical equipment, it is unable to
raise productivity of labour to a sufficient degree, it is unable to increase
the marketable output of agriculture to a sufficient degree. There is only
one way to do this, namely by developing large- scale agriculture
by establishing large farms with modern technical equipment.The Soviet
country cannot however, take the line, of organising. large capitalist
farms. It can and must take only the of organising large farms of a
socialist type, equipped with modern machines. Our state
farms and collective farms are precisely farms of this type.Hence the
task of establishing state farms and uniting the small, individual peasant
farms into large collective farms, as being the only way
to solve the problem of agriculture in general, and the grain problem in
particular.That is the
line the Party took in its everyday practical work after the Fifteenth
Congress, especially after the serious grain difficulties that arose in
the beginning of 1928.It should
he noted that our Party raised this fundamental problem as a practical
task already at the Fifteenth Congress, when we were not yet experiencing
serious grain difficulties. In the resolution of the Fifteenth Congress
on "Work in the Countryside" it is plainly said:
"In the present period, the task of uniting and transforming
the small, individual peasant farms into large collective farms must be
made the Party's principal task in the countryside." (Original Footnote: See
Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU Congresses, Conferences and Central
Committee Plenums, Part 1,1953, p 355). Perhaps it will
not be superfluous also to quote the relevant passage from the Central
Committee's report to the Fifteenth Congress in which the problem of doing
away with the backwardness of agriculture on the basis of collectivisation
was just as sharply and definitely raised. Here is what was stated there:
"What is" the way out? The way out is to turn the small
and scattered peasant farms into large united farms based on cultivation
of the land in common, to go over to collective cultivation of the land
on the basis of a new and higher technique."The way out is to unite the small and dwarf peasant
farms gradually but surely, not by pressure, but by example
and persuasion, into large farms based on common,
co-operative, collective cultivation of the land with the use of agricultural
machines end tractors and scientific methods of Intensive agriculture.
"There is no other way out."(Original Footnote: J V.
Stalin, Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fifteenth Congress
of the CPSU(B) (see Works, Vol. 10, pp. 312-13).The turn of the
peasantry towards collectivisation did not begin all at once. Moreover,
it could not begin all at once. True, the Party proclaimed the slogan of
collectivisation already at the Fifteenth Congress; but the proclamation
of a slogan is not enough to cause the peasantry to turn en masse towards
socialism. At least one more circumstance is needed for this, namely, that
the masses of the peasantry themselves should be convinced that the slogan
proclaimed is a correct one and that they should accept it as their own.
Therefore, this turn was prepared gradually. It was prepared by the whole
course of our development, by the whole course of development of our industry,
and above all by the development of the industry that supplies machines
and tractors for agriculture.It was prepared
by the policy of resolutely fighting the kulaks and by the course of our
grain procurements in the new forms that they assumed in 1928 and 1929,
which placed kulak farming under the control of the poor and middle-peasant
masses. It was prepared by the development of the agricultural co-operatives
which trained the individualist peasant in collective methods. It was prepared
by the network of collective farms, in which the peasantry verified the
advantages of collective farming over individual farming. Lastly it was
prepared by the work of state farms, spread over the whole of the USSR
and equipped with modern machines, which enabled the peasants to convince
themselves of the potency and superiority of modern machines.It would be
a mistake to regard our state farms only as sources of grain supplies.
Actually the state farms, with their modern machines, with the assistance
they render the peasants in their vicinity, and the unprecedented scope
of their farming were the leading force that facilitated the turn of the
peasant masses and brought them on to the path of collectivisation.There you
have the basis on which arose that mass collective-farm movement of millions
of poor and middle peasants which began in the latter half of 1929, and
which ushered in a period of great change in the life of our country.What measures
did the Central Committee take so as to meet this movement and to
lead it?The measures
taken by the Central Committee were along three lines:
 The line of
organising and financing of state farms;
 The line of
organising and financing of collective farms; and lastly
 The line of organising the manufacture of tractors and agricultural machinery and of
supplying the countryside with them through machine and tractor stations,
through tractor columns, and so forth.a) As early
as 1928, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee adopted a decision
to organise new state farms in the course of three or four
years, calculating that by the end of this period these state farms could
provide not less than 100,000,000 poods of marketable grain. Later, this
decision was endorsed by a plenum of the Central Committee. The Grain Trust
was organised and entrusted with the task of carrying out this decision.
Parallel with this, a decision was adopted to strengthen the old state
farms and to enlarge their crop area. The State Farm Centre was
organised and entrusted with the task of carrying out this decision.I cannot help
mentioning that these decisions met with a hostile reception from the opportunist
section of our Party. There was talk about the money invested in the state
farms being money "thrown away." There was also criticism from men of "science",
supported by the Opportunist elements in the Party, to the effect that
it was impossible and senseless to organise large state farms. The Central
Committee, however, continued to pursue its line and pursued it to the
end in spite of everything.In 1927-28,
the sum of 65,700,000 rubles (not counting short-term credits for working
capital) was assigned for financing the state farms. In 1928-29, the sum
of 185,800,000 rubles was assigned. Lastly, this year 856,200,000 rubles
have been assigned. During the period under review, 18,000 tractors with
a total of 350,000 h.p. were placed at the disposal of the state farms.What are the results of these measures?In 1928-29,
the crop area of the Grain Trust amounted to: 
150,000 hectares, in 1929-30 to 1,060,000 hectares, in 1930-31
it will amount to 4,500,000 hectares, in 1931-32 to 9,000,000 hectares, 
and in 1932-33, i.e., towards the end of the five-year plan period, to 14,000,000 hectares.In 1928-29 the crop area of the State Farm Centre amounted to 430,000 hectares, in 1929-30 to 860,000 hectares, in 1930-31 it will amount to 1,800,000 hectares, in 1931-32 to 2,000,000 hectares, and in 1932-33 to 2,500,000 hectares. In 1928-29, the crop area of the Association Ukrainian State Farms amounted to 70,000 hectares, in 1929-30 to 280,000 hectares, in 1930-31 it will amount to 500,000 hectares, and in 1932-33 to 720,000 hectares.

In 1928-29, the crop area of the Sugar Union
(grain crop) amounted to 780,000 hectares,
 in 1929-30 to 820,000 hectares,
 in 1930-31 it will amount to 860,000 hectares,
 in 1931-32 to 980,000 hectares,
 and in 1932-33 to 990,000 hectares. This means, firstly,
that at the end of the five-year plan period the grain crop area of the
Grain Trust alone will be as large as that of the whole of
the Argentine today. (Applause.) It means,
secondly, that at the end of the five-year plan period, the grain crop
area of all the state farms together will be 1,000,000 hectares larger
than that of the whole of Canada today. (Applause.) As regards
the gross and marketable grain output of the
state farms, we have the following picture of the change year by year:
In 1927-28, the gross output of all the state farms
amounted to 9,500,000 centners, of which marketable grain amounted to 6,400,000
centners;
 In 1928-29 — 12,800,000 centners, of which marketable
grain amounted to 7,900,000 centners;
 In 1929-30, we shall have, according to all accounts,
28,200,000 centners, of which marketable grain will amount to 18,000,000
centners (108,000,000 poods);
 In 1930-31 we shall have 71,700,000 centners, of which
marketable grain will amount to 61,000,000 centners (370,000,000 poods);
and so on and so forth.Such are the existing and anticipated results of our Party's
state-farm policy.
 According to the
decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of April 1928
on the organisation of new state farms, we ought to receive from the new
state farms not less than 100,000,000 poods of marketable grain in 1931-32.
Actually, it turns out that in 1931-32 we shall already have from the new
state farms alone more than 200,000,000 poods. That means the programme
will have been fulfilled twice over. It follows
that the people who ridiculed the decision of the Political Bureau of the
Central Committee fiercely ridiculed themselves. According
to the five-year plan endorsed by the Congress of Soviets, by the end of
the five-year plan period the state farms controlled by all organisations
were to have a total crop area of 5,000,000 hectares. Actually, this year
the crop area of the state farms already amounts to 3,800,000 hectares,
and next year, i.e., in the third year of the five-year period, their crop
area will amount to 8,000,000 hectares. This means
that we shall fulfil and overfulfil the five-year programme of state-farm
development in three years. According
to the five-year plan, by the end of the five-year period the gross grain
output of the state farms was to amount to 54,300,000 centners. Actually,
this year the gross grain output of the state farms already amounts to
28,200,000 centners, and next year it will amount to 71,700,000 centners. This means
that as regards gross grain output we shall fulfil and overfulfil the five-year
plan in three years. The five-year plan in three years! Let the bourgeois scribes and their opportunist echoes chatter now about
it being impossible to fulfil and overfulfil the five-year plan of state-farm
development in three years.b) As regards
collective-farm development, we have an even more favourable
picture. As early as
July 1928, a plenum of the Central Committee adopted the following decision
on collective-farm development:'Undeviatingly to carry out the task set by the Fifteenth
Congress 'to unite and transform the small, individual peasant farms into
large collective farms, 'as voluntary associations organised
on the basis of modern technology and representing a higher form of grain
farming both as regards the socialist transformation of agriculture and
as regards ensuring a radical increase in its productivity and marketable
output" (see resolution of the July plenum of the Central Committee on
"Grain-Procurement Policy in Connection With the General Economic Situation,
1928)."(Original Footnote: See Resolutions
and Decisions of CPSU Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee
Plenums, Part II, 1953, p. 393). Later, this decision
was endorsed in the resolutions of the Sixteenth Conference of the Party
and in the special resolution of the November plenum of the Central Committee,
1929, on the collective-farm movement. (Original
Footnote: The plenum of the Central Committee, CPSU(B) held November
10-17, 1929, discussed the following questions: the control figures for
the national economy in 1929-30; results and further tasks of collective-farm
development; agriculture in the Ukraine and work in the countryside; the
formation of a Union People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR;
the fulfilment of the decisions of the July plenum of the C.C. (1928) on
the training of technical cadres. The plenum decided that propaganda of
the views of Right opportunism and of conciliation towards it was
incompatible with membership of the CPSU(B), and resolved to expel
Bukharin, as the chief exponent and leader of the Right capitulators, from
the Political Bureau of the C.C., CPSU(B). The plenum noted that the
Soviet Union had entered a phase of extensive socialist reconstruction
of the countryside and development of large-scale socialist agriculture,
and outlined a series of concrete measures for strengthening the collective
farms and widely developing the collective-farm movement. (For the resolutions
of the plenum see Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU Congresses,
Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 500-43.)
In the latter half of 1929, when the radical turn of the peasants
towards the collective farms had become evident and when the mass of the
middle peasants were joining the collective farms, the Political Bureau
of the Central Committee adopted the special decision of January 5, 1930
on "The Fate of Collectivisation and State Measures to Assist Collective-Farm
Development."In this resolution, the Central Committee:1) placed on record the existence of a mass turn
of the peasantry towards the collective farms and the possibility
of overfulfilling the live-year plan of collective-farm development in
the spring of 1930;2) placed on record the existence of the material and
other conditions necessary for replacing kulak production by
collective-farm production and, in view of this, proclaimed
the necessity of passing from the policy of restricting the kulaks to the
policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class; 3) laid down the prospect
that already in the spring of 1930 the crop area cultivated on a socialised
basis would considerably exceed 30,000,000 hectares;4) divided the USSR into three groups of districts
and fixed for each of them approximate dates for the completion,
in the main, of collectivisation;5) revised the land settlement method in
favour of the collective farms and the forms of financing agriculture,
assigning for the collective farms in 1929-30 credits amounting to not
less than 500,000,000 rubles;6) defined the artel form of the collective-farm
movement as the main link in the collective-farm system at
the present time;7) rebuffed the opportunist elements in the Party who
were trying to retard the collective-farm movement on the plea of a shortage
of machines and tractors;8) lastly, warned Party workers against
possible excesses in the collective-farm movement, and against the danger
of decreeing collective-farm development from above, a danger that would
involve the threat of playing at collectivisation taking the place of a
genuine and mass collective-farm movement.It must be observed
that this decision of the Central Committee met with a more than unfriendly
reception from the opportunist elements in our Party. There was talk and
whispering about the Central Committee indulging in fantasies, about it
"squandering" the people's money on "non-existent" collective farms. The
Right-wing elements rubbed their hands in gleeful anticipation of "certain"
failure. The Central Committee, however, steadfastly pursued its line and
pursued it to the end in spite of everything, in spite of the philistine
sniggering of the Rights, and in spite of the excesses and dizziness of
the "Lefts." In 1927-28, the sum of 76,000,000
rubles was assigned for financing the collective farms, in 1928-29-170,000,000
rubles, and, lastly, this year 473,000,000 rubles have been assigned. In
addition, 65,000,000 rubles have been assigned for the collectivisation
fund. Privileges have been accorded the collective farms, which have increased
their financial resources, by 200,000,000 rubles. The collective farms
have been supplied with confiscated kulak farm property to the value of
over 400,000,000 rubles. There has been supplied for use on collective-farm
fields not less than 30,000 tractors of a total of 400,000 b.p., not counting
the 7,000 tractors of the Tractor Centre which serve the collective farms
and the assistance in the way of tractors rendered the collective farms
by the state farms. This year the collective farms have been granted seed
loans and seed assistance amounting to 10,000,000 centners of grain (61,000,000
poods). Lastly, direct organisational assistance has been rendered the
collective farms in the setting up of machine and horse stations to a number
exceeding 7,000, in which the total number of horses available for use
is not less than 1,300,000. What are the results of these measures?The crop area of the collective farms — in 1927 amounted
to 800,000 hectares, in 1928 — 1,400,000 hectares, in 1929 — 4,300,000 hectares, in 1930 —
not less than 36,000,000 hectares, counting both spring and winter crops.This means,
firstly, that in three years the crop area of the collective farms has
grown more than forty-fold. (Applause.) It means,
secondly, that our collective farms now have a crop area as large
as that of France and Italy put together. (Applause.)As regards
gross grain output and the part available for the market,
we have the following picture.
In 1927 we had from the collective farms 4,900,000 centners,
of which marketable grain amounted to 2,000,000 centners;
 In 1928—8,400,000 centners, of which 3,600,000 centners
was marketable grain;
 In 1929—29,100,000 centners, of which 12,700,000 centners
was marketable grain;
 In 1930 we shall have, according to all accounts, 256,000,000
centners (1,550,000,000 poods), of which marketable grain will amount to
not less than 82,000,000 centners (over 500,000,000 poods) of which marketable
grain will amount to not less than 82,000,000 centners (over 500,000,000
poods).It must be admitted
that not a single branch of our industry, which, in general, is developing
at quite a rapid rate, has shown such an unprecedented rate of progress
as our collective-farm development. What do all these figures show? They show,
first of all, that during three years the gross grain output of the collective
farms has increased more than fifty-fold, and its marketable part more
than forty-fold. They show,
secondly, that the possibility exists of our receiving from the collective
farms this year more than half of the total marketable grain
output of the country.
 They show,
thirdly, that henceforth, the fate of our agriculture and of its main problems
will be determined not by the individual peasant farms, but by the collective
farms and state farms. They show,
fourthly, that the process of eliminating the kulaks as a class in our
country is going full steam ahead. They show,
lastly, that such economic changes have already taken place in the country
as give us full grounds for asserting that we have succeeded in turning
the countryside to the new path, to the path of collectivisation, thereby
ensuring the successful building of socialism not only in the towns, but
also in the countryside. In its decision
of January 5, 4930, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee laid
down for the spring of 1930 a programme of 30,000,000 hectares of collective
farm crop area cultivated on a socialised basis. Actually, we already have
36,000,000 hectares. Thus, the Central Committee's programme has been overfulfilled. It follows
that the people who ridiculed the Central Committee's decision fiercely
ridiculed themselves. Nor have the opportunist chatterboxes in our Party
derived any benefit either from the petty-bourgeois elemental forces or
from the excesses in the collective-farm movement. According
to the five-year plan, by the end of the five-year period we were to have
a collective-farm crop area of 20,600,000 hectares. Actually, we have already
this year a collective-farm crop area of 36,000,000 hectares. This means
that already in two years we shall have overfulfilled the five-year plan
of collective-farm development by over fifty per cent. (Applause.) According
to the five-year plan, by the end of the five-year period we were to have
a gross grain output from the collective farms amounting to 190,500,000
centners. Actually, already this year we shall have a gross grain output
from the collective farms amounting to 256,000,000 centners. This means
that already in two years we shall have overfulfilled the five-year programme
of collective-farm grain output by over 30 per cent. The
five-year plan in two years! (Applause.) Let the opportunist
gossips chatter now about it being impossible to fulfil and overfulfil
the five-year plan of collective-farm development in two years. It follows, therefore,
that the progressive growth of the socialist sector in the sphere of industry
and in the sphere of agriculture is a fact about which there cannot be
the slightest doubt. What can this
signify from the point of view of the material conditions of the working
people? It signifies
that, thereby, the foundations have already been laid for a radical improvement
in the material and cultural conditions of the workers and peasants. Why? How? Because, firstly,
the growth of the socialist sector signifies, above all, a diminution of
the exploiting elements in town and country, a decline in their relative
importance in the national economy. And this means that the workers' and
peasants' share of the national income must inevitably increase owing to
the reduction of the share of the exploiting classes. Because, secondly,
with the growth of the socialised (socialist) sector, the share of the
national income that has hitherto gone to feed the exploiting classes and
their hangers-on, is bound henceforth to remain in production, to be used
for the expansion of production, for building new factories and mills,
for improving the conditions of life of the working people. And this means
that the working class is bound to grow in numbers and strength, and unemployment
to diminish and disappear. Because, lastly,
the growth of the socialised sector, inasmuch as it leads to an improvement
in the material conditions of the working class, signifies a progressive
increase in the capacity of the home market, an increase in the demand
for manufactured goods on the part of the workers and peasants. And this
means that the growth of the home market will outstrip the growth of industry
and push it forward towards continuous expansion. All these
and similar circumstances are leading to a steady improvement in
the material and cultural conditions of the workers and peasants.
a) Let us begin with the numerical growth
of the working class and the diminution of unemployment.
 In 1926-27, the number of
wage-workers (not including unemployed) was 10,990,000.
 In 1927-28, however, we had 11,456,000, in 1928-29
— 11,997,000 and in 1929-30, we shall, by all accounts, have not less than 13,129,000.Of these, manual workers (including agricultural
labour-era and seasonal workers)
numbered:
 in 1926-27 — 7,069,000,
 in 1927-28 — 7,404,000,
 in 1928-29 — 7,758,000,
 in 1929-30 — 8,533,000.Of these, workers employed in large-scale industry
(not including office employees) numbered:
 in 1926-27 — 2,439,000,
 in 1927-28 — 2,632,000,
 in 1928-29 — 2,858,000,
 in 1929-30 — 3,029,000.Thus, we have a picture of the progressive numerical growth
of the working class; and whereas the number of wage-workers has increased
19.5 per cent during the three years and the number of manual workers 20.7
per cent, the number of industrial workers has increased 24.2 per cent.Let us pass
to the question of unemployment. It must be said that in
this sphere considerable confusion reigns both at the People's Commissariat
of Labour and at the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. On the one
hand, according to the data of these institutions we have about a million
unemployed, of whom, those to any degree skilled constitute only 14.3 per
cent, while about 73 per cent are those engaged in so-called intellectual
labour and unskilled workers; the vast majority of the latter are women
and young persons not connected with industrial production. On the other
hand, according to the same data, we are suffering from a frightful shortage
of skilled labour, the labour exchanges are unable to meet about 80 per
cent of the demands for labour by our factories and thus we are obliged
hurriedly, literally as we go along, to train absolutely unskilled people
and make skilled workers out of them in order to satisfy at least the minimum
requirements of our factories. Just try to
find your way out of this confusion. It is clear, at all events, that these
unemployed do not constitute a reserve and still less a permanent
army of un-employed workers of our industry. Well? Even
according to the data of the People's Commissariat of Labour it appears
that in the recent period the number of unemployed has diminished
compared with last year by over 700,000. This means that by May 1,
this year, the number of unemployed had dropped by over 42 per cent. There you
have another result of the growth of the socialist sector of our national
economy.b) We get a still more striking result when we examine
the matter from the point of view of the distribution of the national income
according to classes.The question of the distribution of the national income according to classes
is a fundamental one
from the point of view of the material and cultural conditions of
the workers and peasants. It is not for nothing that the bourgeois economists
of Germany, Britain and the United States try to confuse this question
for the benefit of the bourgeoisie by publishing, every now and again,
their "absolutely objective" investigations on this subject. According
to data of the German Statistical Board, in 1929 the share of wages in
Germany's national income was 70 per cent, and the share of the bourgeoisie
was 30 per cent. According to data of the Federal Trade Commission and
the National Bureau of Economic Research, the workers' share of the national
income of the United States in 1923 amounted to over 54 per cent and the
capitalists' share to over 45 per cent. Lastly, according to data of the
economists Bowley and Stamp the share of the working class in Britain's
national income in 1924 amounted to a little less than 50 per cent and
the capitalists' share to a little over 50 per cent. Naturally,
the results of these investigations cannot be taken on trust. This is because,
apart from faults of a purely economic order, these investigations have
also another kind of fault, the object of which is partly to conceal the
incomes of the capitalists and to minimise them, and partly to inflate
and exaggerate the incomes of the working class by including in it officials
who receive huge salaries. And this is apart from the fact that these investigations
often do not take into account the incomes of farmers and of rural capitalists
in general. Comrade Varga
has subjected these statistics to a critical analysis. Here is the result
that he obtained. It appears that the share of the workers and of the working
people generally in town and country, who do not exploit the labour of
others, was in Germany 55 per cent of the national income, in the United
States-54 per cent, in Britain -45 per cent; whereas the capitalists' share
in Germany was 45 per cent, in the United States-46 per cent, and in Britain-55
per cent. That is how the matter stands in the biggest capitalist countries. How does it stand in the USSR? Here are the data of the State planning Commission. It appears that:
a) The share of the workers and working peasants,
who do not exploit the labour of others, constituted in
our country,
 in 1927-28, 75.2 per cent of the total national income
(including the share of urban and rural wage-workers-33.3 per cent);
 in 1928-29 it was 76.5 per cent (including the share
of urban and rural wage-workers-33.2 per cent); in 1929-30 it was 77.1
per cent (including the share of urban and rural wage-workers-33.5 per
cent).

b) The share of the kulaks and urban capitalists
was:
 in 1927-28 — 8.1 per cent;
 in 1928-29 — 6.5 per cent;
 in 1929-30 — 1.8 per cent.c) The share of handicraftsmen, the majority
of whom are working people, was:
 in 1927-28 — 6.5 per cent;
 in 1928-29 — 5.4 per cent;
 in 1929-30 — 4.4 per cent.d) The share of the state sector, the income
of which is the income of the working class and of the working people generally,
was
 in 1927-28 — 8.4 per cent;
 in 1928-29 — 10 per cent;
 in 1929-30 — 15.2 per cent.e) Lastly, the share of the so-called miscellaneous
(meaning pensions) was
 in 1927-28 — 1.8 per cent;
 in 1928-29 — 1.6 per cent;
 in 1929-30 — 1.5 per cent. Thus, it follows
that, whereas in the advanced capitalist countries the share of the
exploiting classes in the national income is about 50 per cent and even
more, here, in the USSR, the share a/the exploiting classes
in the national income is not more than 2 per cent. This, properly
speaking, explains the striking fact that in the United States in 1922,
according to the American bourgeois writer Denny "one per
cent of estate holders owned 59 per cent of the total wealth," and in Britain,
in 1920-21, according to the same Denny "less than two per cent
of the owners held 64 per cent of the total wealth" (see Denny's book America
Conquers Britain). Can such things
happen in our country, in the USSR, in the Land of Soviets? Obviously,
they cannot. There have long been no "owners" of this kind in the USSR,
nor can there be any. But if in
the USSR, in 1929-30, only about two per cent of the national income
falls to the share of the exploiting classes, what happens to the rest,
the bulk of the national income? Obviously,
it remains in the hands of the workers and working peasants. There you
have the source of the strength and prestige of the Soviet regime among
the vast masses of the working class and peasantry. There you
have the basis of the systematic improvement in the material welfare of
the workers and peasants of the USSRf) In the light
of these decisive facts, one can quite understand the systematic increase
in the real wages of the workers, the increase in the workers' social insurance
budget, the increased assistance to poor- and middle-peasant farms, the
increased assignments for workers' housing, for the improvement of the
workers' living conditions and for mother and child care, and, as a consequence,
the progressive growth of the population of the USSR and the decline
in mortality, particularly in infant mortality. It is known,
for example, that the real wages of the workers, including
social insurance and allocations from, profits to the fund for improvement
of the workers living conditions, have risen to 167 per cent of the pre-war
level. During the past three years, the workers social insurance budget
alone has grown from 980,000,000 rubles in 1927-28 to 1,400,000 000 rubles
in 1929-30. The amount spent on mother and child care during the past three
years (1929-30) was 494,000,000 rubles. The amount spent on pre-school
education (kindergartens, playgrounds, etc.) during the same period was
204,000,000 rubles. The amount spent on workers' housing was 1,880,000,000
rubles. This does
not mean, of course, that everything necessary for an important increase
in real wages has already been done, that real wages could not have been
raised to a higher level. If this has not been done, it is because of the
bureaucracy in our supply organisations in general, and primarily and particularly
because of the bureaucracy in the consumers' co-operatives. According to
the data of the State Planning Commission, in 1929-30 the socialised sector
of internal trade embraced over 99 per cent of wholesale trade and over
89 per cent of retail trade. This means that the co-operatives are systematically
ousting the private sector and are becoming the monopolists in the sphere
of trade. That, of course, is good. What is bad, however, is that in a
number of cases this monopoly operates to the detriment of the consumers.
It appears, that in spite of the almost monopolist position they occupy
in trade, the co-operatives prefer to supply the workers with more "paying"
goods, which yield bigger profits (haberdashery, etc.), and avoid supplying
them with less "paying," although more essential, goods for the workers
(agricultural produce). As a result, the workers are obliged to satisfy
about 25 per cent of their requirements for agricultural produce in the
private market, paying higher prices. That is apart from the fact that
the co-operative apparatus is concerned most of all with its balance and
is therefore reluctant to reduce retail prices in spite of the categorical
instructions of the leading centres. It follows, therefore, that in this
case the co-operatives function not as a socialist sector, but as a peculiar
sector that is infected with a sort of Nepman spirit. The question is,
does anyone need co-operatives of this sort, and what benefit do the workers
derive from their monopoly if they do not carry out the function of seriously
raising the workers' real wages? If, in spite
of this, real wages in our country are steadily rising from year to year,
it means that our social system, our system of distribution of the national
income, and our entire wages policy, are such that they are able to neutralise
and make up for all defects arising from the co-operatives. If to this
circumstance we add a number of other factors, such as the increase in
the role of public catering, lower rents for workers, the vast number of
stipends paid to workers and workers' children, cultural services, and
so forth, we may boldly say that the percentage increase of workers' wages
is much greater than is indicated in the statistics of some of our institutions. All this taken
together, plus the introduction of the seven-hour day for over 830,000
industrial workers (33.5 per cent), plus the introduction of the five-day
week for over a million and a half industrial workers (63.4 per cent),
plus the extensive network of rest homes, sanatoria and health resorts
for workers, to which more than 1,700,000 workers have gone during the
past three years-all this creates conditions of work and life for the working
class that enable us to rear a new generation of workers who are healthy
and vigorous, who are capable of raising the might of the Soviet country
to the proper level and of protecting it with their lives from attaclcs
by its enemies. (Applause.) As regards
assistance to the peasants, both individual and collective-farm peasants,
and bearing in mind also assistance to poor peasants, this in the past
three years (1927-28 -- 1929-30) has amounted to a sum of not less than
4,000,000,000 rubles, provided in the shape of credits and assignments
from the state budget. As is known, assistance in the shape of seeds alone
has been granted the peasants during the past three years to the amount
of not less than 154,000,000 poods. It is not
surprising that the workers and peasants in our country are living fairly
well on the whole, that general mortality has dropped 36 per cent, and
infant mortality 42.5 per cent, below the pre-war level, while the annual
increase in population in our
country is about three million. (Applause.) As regards
the cultural conditions of the workers and peasants, in this sphere too
we have some achievements, which, however, cannot under any circumstances
satisfy us, as they are still small. Leaving out of account workers' clubs
of all kinds, village reading rooms, libraries and abolition of illiteracy
classes, which this year are being attended by 10,500,000 persons, the
situation as regards cultural and educational matters is as follows. This
year elementary schools are being attended by 11,638,000 pupils; secondary
schools - 1,945,000; industrial and technical, transport and agricultural
schools and classes for training workers of ordinary skill—333,100; secondary
technical and equivalent trade schools—238,700; colleges, general and
technical - 190,400. All this has enabled us to raise literacy in the USSR
to 62.6 per cent of the population, compared with 33 per cent in pre-war
times. The chief
thing now is to pass to universal, compulsory elementary education. I say
the "chief" thing, because this would be a decisive step in the cultural
revolution. And it is high time we took this step, for we now possess all
that is needed to organise compulsory, universal elementary education in
all areas of the USSR. Until now
we have been obliged to "exercise economy in all things, even in schools"
in order to "save, to restore heavy industry" (Lenin). During
the recent period, however, we have already restored heavy industry
and are developing it further. Hence, the time has arrived when we must
set about fully achieving universal, compulsory elementary education. I think that
the congress will do the right thing if it adopts a definite and absolutely
categorical decision on this matter. (Applause.)I have spoken
about our achievements in developing our national economy. I have spoken
about our achievements in industry, in agriculture, in reconstructing the
whole of our national economy on the basis of socialism. Lastly, I have
spoken about our achievements in improving the material conditions of the
workers and peasants. It would be
a mistake however, to think that we achieved all this "easily and quietly",
automatically, so to speak, without exceptional effort and exertion of
willpower, without struggle and turmoil. Such achievements do not come
about automatically. In fact, we achieved all this in a resolute struggle
against difficulties, in a serious and prolonged struggle to surmount difficulties. Everybody
among us talks about difficulties, but not everybody realises the character
of these dfficulties. And yet the problem of difficulties is of serious
importance for us. What are the
characteristic features of our difficulties, what hostile forces are hidden
behind them, and how are we surmounting them? a) When characterising
our difficulties we must bear in mind at least the following circumstances. First of all,
we must take into account the circumstance that our present difficulties
are difficulties of the reconstruction period. What does
this mean? It means that they differ fundamentally from the difficulties
of the restoration period of our economy. Whereas in the
restoration period it was a matter of keeping the old factories running
and assisting agriculture on its old basis, today it is a matter of fundamentally
rebuilding, reconstructing both industry and agriculture, altering their
technical basis and providing them with modern technical equipment. It
means that we are faced with the task of reconstructing the entire technical
basis of our national economy. And this calls for new, more substantial
investments in the national economy, for new and more experienced cadres,
capable of mastering the new technology and of developing it further.Secondly, we
must bear in mind the circumstance that in our country the reconstruction
of the national economy is not limited to rebuilding its technical basis,
but that, on the contrary, parallel with this, it calls for the reconstruction
of social-economic relationships. Here I have in mind, mainly, agriculture.
In industry, which is already united and socialised, technical reconstruction
already has, in the main, a ready-made social-economic basis. Here, the
task of reconstruction is to accelerate the process of ousting the capitalist
elements from industry. The matter is not so simple in agriculture. The
reconstruction of the technical basis of agriculture pursues, of course,
the same aims. The specific feature of agriculture in our country, however,
is that small-peasant farming still predominates in it, that small farming
is unable to master the new technology and that, in view of this, the reconstruction
of the technical basis of agriculture is impossible without
simultaneously re-constructing the old social-economic order, without unit-ing
the small individual farms into large, collective farms, without tearing
out the roots of capitalism in agriculture. Naturally,
these circumstances cannot but complicate our difficulties, cannot but
complicate our work in surmounting these difficulties.Thirdly, we must hear in mind the circumstance
that our work for the socialist reconstruction of the national economy,
since it breaks up the economic connections of capitalism and turns all
the forces of the old world upside down, cannot but rouse the desperate
resistance of these forces. Such is the case, as you know. The malicious
wrecking activities of the top stratum of the bourgeois intelligentsia
in all branches of our industry, the brutal struggle of the kulaks
against collective forms of farming in the countryside, the sabotage
of the Soviet government's measures by bureaucratic elements
in the state apparatus, who are agents of our class enemy—such, so
far, are the chief forms of the resistance of the moribund classes in our
country. Obviously, these circumstances cannot facilitate our work of reconstructing
the national economy.Fourthly, we
must hear in mind the circumstance that the resistance of the moribund
classes in our country is not taking place in isolation from the outside
world, hut is receiving the support of the capitalist encirclement. Capitalist
encirclement must not be regarded simply as a geographical concept. Capitalist
encirclement means that the USSR is surrounded by hostile class forces,
which are ready to support our class enemies within the USSR morally,
materially, by means of a financial blockade and, if the opportunity offers,
by military intervention. It has been proved that the wrecking activities
of our specialists, the anti-Soviet activities of the kulaks, and the incendiarism
and explosions at our factories and installations are subsidised and inspired
from abroad. The imperialist world is not interested in the USSR standing
up firmly and becoming able to overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist
countries. Hence, the assistance it renders the forces of the old world
in the USSR Naturally, this circumstance, too, cannot serve to facilitate
our work of reconstruction. The characterisation
of our difficulties will not be complete, however, if we fail to bear in
mind one other circumstance. I am referring to the special character of
our difficulties. I am referring to the fact that our difficulties are
not difficulties of decline, or of stagnation,
but difficulties of growth, difficulties of ascent,
difficulties of progress. This means that our difficulties
differ fundamentally from those encountered by the capitalist countries.
When people in the United States talk about difficulties they have in mind
difficulties due to decline, for America is now going through
a crisis, i.e., economic decline. When people in Britain talk about difficulties
they have in mind difficulties due to stagnation, for Britain,
for a number of years already, has been experiencing stagnation, i.e.,
cessation of progress. When we speak about our difficulties, however, we
have in mind not decline and not stagnation in development, but the growth
of our forces, the upswing of our forces, the progress
of our economy. How many points shall we move further forward
by a given date? What per cent more goods shall we produce?
How many million more hectares shall we sow? How many months
earlier shall we erect a factory, a mill, a railway? Such
are the questions that we have in mind when we speak of difficulties. Consequently,
our difficulties, unlike those encountered by, say, America or Britain,
are difficulties of growth, difficulties of progress. What does
this signify? It signifies that our difficulties are such as
contain within themselves the possibility of surmounting them. It
signifies that the distinguishing feature of our difficulties is
that they themselves give us the basis for surmounting them.
What follows from all this?
It follows from this, first of all that our difficulties are not difficulties
due to minor and accidental "derangements," but difficulties arising from
the class struggle.
It follows from this secondly, that behind our difficulties are hidden
our class enemies, that these difficulties are complicated by the
desperate resistance of the moribund classes in our country, by the support
that these classes receive from abroad, by the existence of bureaucratic
elements in our own institutions, by the existence of unsureness and conservatism
among certain sections of our Party.
It follows from this thirdly, that to surmount the difficulties it is necessary
first of all, to repulse the attacks of the capitalist elements, to crush
their resistance and thereby clear the way for rapid progress.
It follows from this, lastly, that the very character of our difficulties,
being difficulties of growth, creates the possibilities
that we need for crushing our class enemies.
There is only one means, however, of taking advantage of these possibilities
and of converting them into reality, of crushing the
resistance of our class enemies and surmounting the difficulties, and that
is to organise an offensive against the capitalist elements
along the whole front and to isolate the opportunist elements
in our own ranks, who are hindering the offensive, who are rushing in panic
from one side to another and sowing doubt in the Party about the possibility
of victory. (Applause.)
There are no other means.
Only people who have lost their heads can seek a way out in Bukharin's
childish formula about the capitalist elements peacefully growing into
socialism. In our country development has not proceeded and is not proceeding
according to Bukharin's formula. Development has proceeded, and is proceeding,
according to Lenin's formula "who will beat whom." Either we vanquish and
crush them, the exploiters, or they will vanquish and crush us, the workers
and peasants of the USSR—that is how the question stands, comrades. Thus, the
organisation of the offensive of socialism along the whole front—that is the task that arose before us in developing our work
of reconstructing the entire national economy. That is precisely
how the Party interpreted its mission in organising the offensive against
the capitalist elements in our country.b) But is an
offensive, and an offensive along the whole front at that, permissible
at all under the conditions of NEP? Some think
that an offensive is incompatible with NEP—that NEP is essentially a
retreat, that, since the retreat has ended, NEP must be abolished. That
is non-sense, of course. It is nonsense that emanates either from the Trotskyists,
who have never understood anything about Leninism and who think of "abolishing"
NEP "in a trice," or from the Right opportunists, who have also never understood
Leninism, and think that by chattering about the "the threat to abolish
NEP", they can manage to secure abandonment of the offensive. If NEP was
nothing but a retreat, Lenin would not have said at the Eleventh Congress
of the Party, when we were implementing NEP with the utmost consistency,
that "the retreat has ended." When Lenin said that the retreat had ended,
did he not also say that we were thinking of carrying out NEP "in earnest
and for a long time"? It is sufficient to put this question to understand
the utter absurdity of the talk about NEP being incompatible with an offensive.
In point of fact, NEP does not merely presuppose a retreat and
permission for the revival of private trade, permission for the revival
of capitalism while ensuring the regulating role of the state (the initial
stage of NEP). In point of fact, NEP also presupposes at a certain stage
of development, the offensive of socialism against the capitalist
elements, the restriction of the field of activity of private
trade, the relative and absolute diminution of capitalism,
the increasing preponderance of the socialised sector over
the non-socialised sector, the victory of socialism over capitalism (the
present stage of NEP). NEP was introduced to ensure the victory of socialism
over the capitalist elements. In passing to the offensive along the whole
front, we do not yet abolish NEP for private trade and the capitalist elements
still remain, "free" trade still remains—but we are certainly abolishing
the initial stage of NEP, while developing its next stage, the present
stage, which is the last stage of NEP. Here is what
Lenin said in 1922, a year after NEP was introduced:
"We are now retreating, going back as it were; but we
are doing this in order, by retreating first, afterwards to take a run
and make a more powerful leap forward. It was on this condition alone that
we retreated in pursuing our New Economic Policy. We do not yet know where
and how we must now regroup, adapt and reorganise our forces in order to
start a most persistent advance after our retreat. In order to carry out
all these operations in proper order we must, as the proverb says, measure
not ten times, but a hundred times before we decide." (Vol. XXVII, pp.361-62).Clear, one would think.
 But the question
is: has the time already arrived to pass to the offensive, is the moment
ripe for an offensive? Lenin said in another passage in the same year,
1922, that it was necessary to:
"Link up with the peasant masses, with the rank-and-file
toiling peasants, and begin to move forward immeasurably, infinitely, more
slowly than we imagined, but in such a way that the entire mass will actually
move forward with us" . . . that "if we do that we shall in time get such
an acceleration of progress as we cannot dream of now".
(Vol. XXVII, pp.231-32). And so the same
question arises: has the time already arrived for such an acceleration
of progress, for speeding up the rate of our development? Did we choose
the right moment in passing to the decisive offensive along the whole front
in the latter half of 1929? To this question
the Party has already given a clear and definite answer. Yes, that
moment had already arrived. Yes, the Party
chose the right moment to pass to the offensive along the whole front. This is proved
by the growing activity of the working class and by the unprecedented growth
of the Party's prestige among the vast masses of the working people. It is proved
by the growing activity of the masses of the poor and middle peasants,
and by the radical turn of these masses towards collective-farm development. It is
proved by our achievements both in the development of industry and in the
development of state farms and collective farms.
It is proved by the fact that we are now in a position not only to replace
kulak production by collective-farm and state-farm production, but to exceed
the former several times over.
It is proved by the fact that we have already succeeded, in the main, in
solving the grain problem and in accumulating definite grain reserves,
by shifting the centre of the production of marketable grain from the sphere
of individual production to that of collective-farm and state-farm production. There you
have the proof that the Party chose the right moment to pass to the offensive
along the whole front and to proclaim the slogan of eliminating the kulaks
as a class. What would
have happened had we heeded the Right opportunists of Bukharin's group,
had we refrained from launching the offensive, had we slowed down the rate
of development of industry, had we retarded the development of collective
farms and state farms and had we based ourselves on individual peasant
farming? We should
certainly have wrecked our industry, we should have rained the socialist
reconstruction of agriculture, we should have been left without bread and
have cleared the way for the predominance of the kulaks.
We should have been as badly off as before. What would
have happened had we heeded the "Left" opportunists of the Trotsky-Zinoviev
group and launched the offensive in 1926-27, when we bad no possibility
of replacing kulak production by collective-farm and state-farm production? We should
certainly have met with failure in this matter, we should have demonstrated
our weakness, we should have strengthened the position of the kulaks and
of thc capitalist elements generally, we should have pushed the middle
peasants into the embrace of the kulaks, we should have disrupted our socialist
development and have been left without bread. We should have been as badly
off as before. The results
would have been the same.
It is not for nothing that our workers say: "When you
go to the 'left' you arrive on the right."
(Applause.)
 Some comrades
think that the chief thing in the offensive of socialism is measures of
repression, that if there is no increase of measures of repression there
is no offensive. Is that true?
Of course, it is not true.Measures of
repression in the sphere of socialist construction are a necessary element
of the offensive, but they are an auxiliary, not the chief element. The
chief thing in the offensive of socialism under our present conditions
is to speed up the rate of development of our industry, to speed up the
rate of state-farm and collective-farm development, to speed up the rate
of the economic ousting of the capitalist elements in town and country,
to mobilise the masses around socialist construction, to mobilise the masses
against capitalism. You may arrest and deport tens and hundreds of thousands
of kulaks, but if you do not at the same time do all that is necessary
to speed up the development of the new forms of farming, to replace the
old, capitalist forms of farming by the new forms, to undermine and abolish
the production sources of the economic existence and development of the
capitalist elements in the countryside—the kulaks will, nevertheless,
revive and grow. Others think
that the offensive of socialism means advancing headlong, without proper
preparation, without regrouping forces in the course of the offensive,
with-out consolidating captured positions, without utilising reserves to
develop successes, and that if signs have appeared of, say, an exodus of
a section of the peasants from the collective farms it means that there
is already the "ebb of the revolution," the decline of the movement, the
cessation of the offensive. Is that true?
Of course, it is not true.Firstly, no
offensive, even the most successful, can proceed without some breaches
or incursions on individual sectors of the front. To argue, on these grounds,
that the offensive has stopped, or has failed, means not to understand
the essence of an offensive.Secondly, there
has never been, nor can there be, a successful offensive
without regrouping forces in the course of the offensive itself, without
consolidating captured positions, without utilising reserves for developing
success and for carrying the offensive through to the end. Where there
is a headlong advance, i.e., without observing these conditions, the offensive
must inevitably peter out and fail. A headlong advance means death to the
offensive. This is proved by the wealth of experience of our Civil War.
Thirdly, how can an analogy be drawn between the "ebb of the revolution,"
which usually takes place on the basis of a decline of the
movement, and the withdrawal of a section of the peasantry from the collective
farms, which took place against a background of the continuing upswing
of the movement, against a background of the continuing upswing
of the whole of our socialist development, both industrial and collective-farm,
against a background of the continuing upswing of our revolution?
What can there be in common between these two totally different phenomena?c) What is the essence of the Bolshevik offensive under
our present conditions? The essence
of the Bolshevik offensive lies, first and foremost, in mobilising the
class vigilance and revolutionary activity of the masses against the capitalist
elements in our country; in mobilising the creative initiative and independent
activity of the masses against bureaucracy in our institutions and organisations,
which keeps concealed the colossal reserves latent in the depths of our
system and prevents them from being used; in organising emulation and labour
enthusiasm among the masses for raising the productivity of labour, for
developing socialist construction.The essence
of the Bolshevik offensive lies, secondly, in organising the reconstruction
of the entire practical work of the trade-union, co-operative, Soviet and
all other mass organisations to fit the requirements of the reconstruction
period; in creating in them a core of the most active and revolutionary
functionaries, pushing aside and isolating the opportunist, trade-unionist,
bureaucratic elements; in expelling from them the alien and degenerate
elements and promoting new cadres from the rank and file.The essence
of the Bolshevik offensive lies, further, in mobilising the maximum funds
for financing our industry, for financing our state farms and collective
farms, in appointing the best people in our Party for developing all this
work.The essence
of the Bolshevik offensive lies, lastly, in mobilising the Party itself
for organising the whole offensive; in strengthening and giving a sharp
edge to the Party organisations, exposing elements of bureaucracy and degeneration
from them; in isolating and thrusting aside those that express Right or
"Left" deviations from the Leninist line and bringing to the fore genuine,
staunch Leninists.Such are the
principles of the Bolshevik offensive at the present time.How has the Party carried out this plan of the offensive?You know that
the Party has carried out this plan with the utmost consistency.Matters started
by the Party developing wide self-criticism, concentrating
the attention of the masses upon shortcomings in our work of construction,
upon short-comings in our organisations and institutions. The need for
intensifying self-criticism was proclaimed already at the Fifteenth Congress.
The Shakty affair and the wrecking activities in various branches of industry,
which revealed the absence of revolutionary vigilance in some of the Party
organisations, on the one hand, and the struggle against the kulaks and
the defects revealed in our rural organisations, on the other hand, gave
a further impetus to self-criticism. In its appeal of June 2, 1928, (Original
Footnote: This refers to an appeal of
the C.C., CPSU(B) "To All Party Members and to All Workers" on developing
self-criticism, which was published in Pravda, No.128, June 3, 1928) the
Central Committee gave final shape to the campaign for self-criticism,
calling upon all the forces of the Party and the working class to develop
self-criticism "from top to bottom and from the bottom up" "irrespective
of persons." Dissociating itself from the Trotskyist "criticism emanating
from the other side of the barricade and aiming at discrediting and weakening
the Soviet regime, the Party proclaimed the task of self-criticism to be
the ruthless exposure of shortcomings in our work for the purpose of improving
our work of construction and strengthening the Soviet
regime. As is known, the Party's appeal met with a most lively response
among the masses of the working class and peasantryFurther, the
Party organised a wide campaign for the struggle against bureaucracy
and issued the slogan of purging the Party, trade-union
cooperative and Soviet organisations of alien and bureaucratised elements.
A sequel to this campaign was the well-known decision of the Central Committee
and Central Control Commission of March 16, 1930, concerning the promotion
of workers to posts in the state apparatus and the organisation of mass
workers' control of the Soviet apparatus (patronage by factories). (Original
Footnote: The decision of the C.C. and
C.C.C., CPSU(B) on "Promotion of Workers to Posts in the State Apparatus,
and Mass Workers' Control from Below of the Soviet Apparatus (Patronage
by Factories)" was published in Pravda, No. 74, March 16, 1930.)
As is known, this campaign evoked tremendous enthusiasm and activity among
the masses of the workers. The result of this campaign has been an immense
increase in the Party's prestige among the masses of the working people,
an increase in the confidence of the working class in the Party, the influx
into the Party of further hundreds of thousands of workers, and the resolutions
passed by workers expressing the desire to join the Party in whole shops
and factories. Lastly, a result of this campaign has been that our organisations
have got rid of a number of conservative and bureaucratic elements, and
the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions has got rid of the old, opportunist
leadership.Further, the
Party organised wide socialist emulation and mass labour
enthusiasm in the factories and mills. The appeal of the Sixteenth
Party Conference concerning emulation started the ball rolling. The shock
brigades are pushing it on further. The Leninist Young Communist League
and the working-class youth which it guides are crowning the cause of emulation
and shock-brigade work with decisive successes. It must be admitted that
our revolutionary youth have played an exceptional role in this matter.
There can be no doubt now that one of the most important, if not the most
important, factor in our work of construction at the present time is socialist
emulation among factories and mills, the interchange of challenges of hundreds
of thousands of workers on the results achieved in emulation, the wide
development of shock-brigade work.Only the blind
fail to see that a tremendous change has taken place in the mentality of
the masses and in their attitude to work, a change which has radically
altered the appearance of our mills and factories. Not so long ago voices
were still heard among us saying that emulation and shock-brigade work
were "artificial inventions," and "unsound." Today, these "sages" do not
even provoke ridicule, they are regarded simply as "sages" who have outlived
their time. The cause of emulation and shock-brigade work is now a cause
that has been won and consolidated. It is a fact that over two million
of our workers are engaged in emulation, and that not less than a million
workers belong to shock brigades.The most remarkable
feature of emulation is the radical revolution it brings about in people's
views of labour, for it transforms labour from a degrading and heavy burden,
as it was considered before, into a matter of honour, a matter
of glory, a matter of valour and heroism.
There is not, nor can there be, anything of the sort in capitalist
countries. There, among the capitalists, the most desirable thing, deserving
of public approval, is to be a bondholder, to live on interest, not to
have to work, which is regarded as a contemptible occupation. Here, in
the USSR, on the contrary, what is becoming the most desirable thing,
deserving of public approval, is the possibility of being a hero of labour,
the possibility of being a hero in shock-brigade work, surrounded with
an aureole of esteem among millions of working people.A no less remarkable
feature of emulation is the fact that it is beginning to spread also in
the countryside, having already spread to our state farms and collective
farms. Everybody is aware of the numerous cases of genuine labour enthusiasm
being displayed by the vast masses of state-farm workers and collective
farmers.Who could have
dreamed of such successes in emulation and shock-brigade work a couple
of years ago?Further, the
Party mobilised the country's financial resources for the purpose of developing
state farms and collective farms, supplied the state farms with the best
organisers, sent 25,000 front-rank workers to assist the collective farms,
promoted the best people among the collective-farm peasants to leading
posts in the collective farms and organised a network of training classes
for collective farmers, thereby laying the foundation for the training
of staunch and tried cadres for the collective-farm movement.Lastly, the
Party re-formed its own ranks in battle order, re-equipped the press, organised
the struggle on two fronts, routed the remnants of Trotskyism, utterly
defeated the Right deviators, isolated the conciliators, and thereby ensured
the unity of its ranks on the basis of the Leninist line, which is essential
for a successful offensive, and properly led this offensive, pulling up
and putting in their place both the gradualists of the camp of the Rights
and the "Left" distorters in regard to the collective-farm movement.Such are the
principal measures that the Party carried out in conducting the offensive
along the whole front.Everybody knows
that this offensive has been crowned with success in all spheres of our
work.That is why
we have succeeded in surmounting a whole number of difficulties of the
period of reconstruction of our national economy.That is why
we are succeeding in surmounting the greatest difficulty in our development,
the difficulty of turning the main mass of the peasantry towards socialism.Foreigners
sometimes ask about the internal situation in the USSR But can there
be any doubt that the internal situation in the USSR is firm and unshakable?
Look at the capitalist countries, at the growing crisis and unemployment
in those countries, at the strikes and lockouts, at the anti-government
demonstrations—what comparison can there be between the internal situation
in those countries and the internal situation in the USSR?It must be
admitted that the Soviet regime is now the most stable of all the regimes
in the world. (Applause.)Thus, we have the picture of the internal situation in
the USSR
 We also have the
picture of the internal situation in the chief capitalist countries. The question
involuntarily arises. What is the result if we place the two pictures side
by side and compare them?
 This question
is all the more interesting for the reason that the bourgeois leaders in
all countries and the bourgeois press of all degrees and ranks, from the
arrant capitalist to the Menshevik—Trotskyist, are all shouting with
one accord about the "prosperity" of the capitalist countries, about the
ëdoom" of the USSR, about the "financial and economic bankruptcy "
of the USSR, and so forth. And so, what
is the result of the analysis of the situation in our country, the USSR,
and over there, in the capitalist countries?Let us note
the main, generally known facts. Over there, in the capitalist countries,
there is economic crisis and a decline in production,
both in industry and in agriculture. Here, in the
USSR, there is an economic upswing and rising
production in all spheres of the national economy. Over there,
in the capitalist countries, there is deterioration of the
material conditions of the working people, reduction of wages
and increasing unemployment. Here, in the
USSR, there is improvement in the material conditions
of the working people, rising wages and diminishing
unemployment. Over there,
in the capitalist countries, there are increasing strikes
and demonstrations, which lead to the loss of millions of
work-days. Here, in the
USSR, there are no strikes, but rising labour enthusiasm
among the workers and peasants, by which our social system gains
millions of additional work-days. Over there,
in the capitalist countries, there is increasing tension in
the internal situation and growth of the revolutionary
working-class movement against the capitalist regime. Here, in the
USSR, there is consolidation of the internal situation
and the vast masses of the working class are united around
the Soviet regime. Over there,
in the capitalist countries, there is growing acuteness of
the national question and growth of the national-liberation
movement in India, Indo-China, Indonesia, in the Philippines, etc., developing
into national war. Here, in the
USSR, the foundations of national fraternity have been strengthened,
peace among the nations is ensured and the vast masses of the people
in the USSR are united around the Soviet regime. Over there,
in the capitalist countries, there is confusion and the prospect
of further deterioration of the situation. Here, in the
USSR, there is confidence in our strength and the prospect
of further improvement in the situation. They chatter
about the "doom" of the USSR, about the "prosperity" of the capitalist
countries, and so forth. Would it not be more correct to speak about the
inevitable doom of those who have so "unexpectedly" fallen into the maelstrom
of economic crisis and to this day are unable to extricate themselves from
the slough of despond? What are the
causes of such a grave collapse over there, in the capitalist
countries, and of the important successes here, in the USSR? It is said
that the state of the national economy depends in a large measure upon
the abundance or dearth of capital. That, of course, is true! But can the
crisis in the capitalist countries and the upswing in the USSR be explained
by abundance of capital here and a dearth of capital over there? No, of
course not. Every body knows that there is much less capital in the USSR
than there is in the capitalist countries. If matters were decided
in the present instance by the state of accumulations, there would
be a crisis here and a boom in the capitalist countries. It is said
that the state of economy depends in a large measure on the technical and
organising experience of the economic cadres. That, of course, is true.
But can the crisis in the capitalist countries and the upswing in the USSR
be explained by the dearth of technical cadres over there and to an abundance
of them here? No, of course not! Everybody knows that there are far more
technically experienced cadres in the capitalist countries than there are
here, in the USSR We have never concealed, and do not intend to conceal,
that in the sphere of technology we are the pupils of the Germans, the
British, the French, the Italians, and, first and foremost, of the Americans.
No, matters are not decided by the abundance or dearth of technically experienced
cadres, although the problem of cadres is of great importance for the development
of the national economy. Perhaps the
answer to the riddle is that the cultural level is higher in our country
than in the capitalist countries? Again, no. Everybody knows that the general
cultural level of the masses is lower in our country than in the United
States, Britain or Germany. No, it is not a matter of the cultural level
of the masses, although this is of enormous importance for the development
of the national economy. Perhaps the
cause lies in the phenomenal qualities of the leaders of the capitalist
countries? Again, no. Crises were born together with the advent of the
rule of capitalism. For over a hundred years already there have been periodic
economic crises of capitalism, recurring every 12, 10, 8 or fewer years.
All the capitalist parties, all the more or less prominent capitalist leaders,
from the greatest "geniuses" to the greatest mediocrities, have tried their
hand at "preventing" or "abolishing" crises. But they have all suffered
defeat. Is it surprising that Hoover and his group have also suffered defeat?
No, it is not a matter of the capitalist leaders or parties, although both
the capitalist leaders and par-ties are of no little importance in this
matter. What is the cause, then? What is the
cause of the fact that the USSR, despite its cultural backwardness,
despite the dearth of capital, despite the dearth of technically experienced
economic cadres, is in a state of increasing economic upswing
and has achieved decisive successes on the front of economic
construction, whereas the advanced capitalist countries, despite their
abundance of capital, their abundance of technical cadres and their higher
cultural level, are in a state of growing economic crisis and
in the sphere of economic development are suffering defeat after
defeat? The cause
lies in the difference in the economic systems
here and in the capitalist countries. The cause lies in the bankruptcy
of the capitalist system of economy. The cause lies in the advantages
of the Soviet system of economy over the capitalist system.
 What is the
Soviet system of economy?
 The Soviet
system of economy means that:1) the power of the class of capitalists and land-lords
has been overthrown and replaced by the power of the working class and
labouring peasantry;2) the instruments and means of production, the land,
factories, mills, etc., have been taken from the capitalists and transferred
to the ownership of the working class and the labouring masses of the peasantry;3) the development of production is subordinated not to
the principle of competition and of ensuring capitalist profit, but to
the principle of planned guidance and of systematically raising the material
and cultural level of the working people;4) the distribution of the national income takes place
not with a view to enriching the exploiting classes and their numerous
parasitical hangers-on, but with a view to ensuring the systematic improvement
of the material conditions of the workers and peasants and the expansion
of socialist production in town and country;5) the systematic improvement in the material conditions
of the working people and the continuous increase in their requirements
(purchasing power), being a constantly increasing source of the expansion
of production, guarantees the working people against crises of over-production,
growth of unemployment and poverty;6) the working class and the labouring peasantry are the
masters of the country, working not for the benefit of capitalists, but
for their own benefit, the benefit of the working people.Such are the advantages of theSoviet system
of economy over the capitalist system.Such are the advantages of the Socialist organisation
of economy over the capitalist organisation.What is the capitalist system of economy?The capitalist system of economy means that:1) power in the country is in the hands of the capitalists;2) the instruments and means of production are concentrated
in the hands of the exploiters;3) production is subordinated not to the principle of
improving the material conditions of the masses of the working people,
but to the principle of ensuring high capitalist profit;4) the distribution of the national income takes place
not with a view to improving the material conditions of the working people,
but with a view to ensuring the maximum profits for the exploiters;5) capitalist rationalisation and the rapid growth of
production, the object of which is to ensure high profits for the capitalists,
encounters an obstacle in the shape of the poverty-stricken conditions
and the decline in the material security of the vast masses of the working
people, who are not always able to satisfy their needs even within the
limits of the extreme minimum, which inevitably creates the basis for unavoidable
crises of overproduction, growth of unemployment, mass poverty;6) the working class and the labouring peasantry are exploited,
they work not for their own benefit, but for the benefit of an alien class,
the exploiting class.Such are the advantages of the Soviet system of
economy over the capitalist system. Such are the advantages of the socialist organisation
of economy over the capitalist organisation.
 That
is why here, in the USSR, we have an increasing economic upswing, whereas
in the capitalist countries there is growing economic crisis.That is why
here, in the USSR, the increase of mass consumption (purchasing power)
continuously outstrips the growth of production and pushes it forward,
whereas over there, in the capitalist countries, on the contrary, the increase
of mass consumption (purchasing power) never keeps pace with the growth
of production and continuously lags behind it, thus dooming industry to
crises from time to time.That is why
over there, in the capitalist countries, it is considered quite a normal
thing during crises to destroy "superfluous" goods and to burn "superfluous"
agricultural produce in order to bolster up prices and ensure high profits,
whereas here, in the USSR, anybody guilty of such crimes would be sent
to a lunatic asylum. (Applause.)That is why
over there, in the capitalist countries, the workers go on strike and demonstrate,
organising a revolutionary struggle against the existing capitalist regime,
whereas here, in the USSR, we have the picture of great labour emulation
among millions of workers and peasants who are ready to defend the Soviet
regime with their lives.That is the
cause of the stability and security of the internal situation in the USSR
and of the instability and insecurity of the internal situation in the
capitalist countries.It must be
admitted that a system of economy that does not know what to do with its
"superfluous" goods and is obliged to burn them at a time when want and
unemployment, hunger and ruin reign among the masses—such a system of
economy pronounces its own death sentence.The recent
years have been a period of practical test, an examination period of the
two opposite systems of economy, the Soviet and capitalist. During these
years we have heard more than enough prophecies of the "doom," of the "downfall"
of the Soviet system. There has been even more talk and singing about the
"prosperity" of capitalism. And what has happened? These years have proved
once again that the capitalist system of economy is a bankrupt
system, and that the Soviet system of economy possesses advantages
of which not a single bourgeois state, even the most "democratic,"
most "popular," etc., dares to dream.
In his speech at the conference of the R.C.P.(B) in May 1921, Lenin
said:
"At the present time
we are exercising our main influence on the international revolution by
our economic policy. All eyes are turned on the Soviet Russian Republic,
the eyes of all toilers in all countries of the world without exception
and without exaggeration. This we have achieved. The capitalists cannot
hush up, conceal, anything, that is why they most of all seize upon our
economic mistakes and our weakness. That is the field to which the struggle
has been transferred on a world-wide scale. If we solve this problem, we
shall have won on an international scale surely and finally" (Vol. XXVI,
pp. 410-11).It must be admitted that our Party is successfully carrying out the task
set by Lenin.a) General 1) First of
all there is the problem of the proper distribution of industry throughout
the U.S.S.R. However much we may develop our national economy,
we cannot avoid the question of how properly to distribute industry, which
is the leading branch of the national economy. The situation at present
is that our industry, like the whole of our national economy, rests, in
the main, on the coal and metallurgical base in the Ukraine. Naturally,
without such a base, the industrialisation of the country is inconceivable.
Well, the Ukraine fuel and metallurgical base serves us as such a base.
But can this one base satisfy in future the south, the central part of
the USSR the North, the North-East, the Far East and Turkestan? All
the facts go to show that it cannot. The new feature of the development
of our national economy is, among other things, that this base has already
become inadequate for us. The new feature is
that, while continuing to develop this base to the utmost, we must begin
immediately to create a second coal and metallurgical base. This base must
be the Urals-Kuznetsk Combine, the combination of Kuznetsk coking coal
with the ore of the Urals. (Applause.)
The construction of the automobile
works in Nizhni-Novgorod, the tractor works in Chelyabinsk, the machine-building
works in Sverdlovsk, the harvester-combine works in Saratov and Novosibirsk;
the existence of the growing non-ferrous metal industry in Siberia and
Kazakhstan, which calls for the creation of a network of repair shops and
a number of major metallurgical factories in the east; and, lastly, the
decision to erect textile mills in Novosibirsk and Turkestan-all this imperatively
demands that we should proceed immediately to create a second coal and
metallurgical base in the Urals.
You know that the Central Committee of our Party expressed itself precisely
in this spirit in its resolution on the Urals Metal Trust. (Original
Footnote: This refers to the
decision of the C.C., CPSU(B) of May 15, 1930), on "The Work of Uralmet"
(a trust embracing the iron and steel industry of the Urals). It was published
in Pravda, No. 135, May 18, 1930.)
2) Further, there is the problem of the
proper distribution of the
basic branches of agriculture
throughout the USSR,
the problem of our
regions specialising in particular agricultural crops and branches
of agriculture. Naturally,
with small-peasant farming real specialisation is impossible. It is impossible
because small farming being unstable and lacking the necessary reserves,
each farm is obliged to grow all kinds of crops so that in the event of
one crop failing it can keep going with the others. Naturally, too, it
is impossible to organise specialisation unless the state possesses certain
reserves of grain. Now that we have passed over to large-scale farming
and ensured that the state possesses reserves of grain, we can and must
set ourselves the task of properly organising specialisation according
to crops and branches of agriculture. The starting point for this is the
complete solution of the grain problem. I say "starting point," because
unless the grain problem is solved, unless a large network of granaries
is set up in the live-stock, cotton, sugar-beet, flax and tobacco districts,
it will be impossible to promote livestock farming and industrial crop
cultivation, it will be impossible to organise the specialisation of our
regions according to crops and branches of agriculture.
The task is to take advantage of the possibilities that have opened up
and to push this matter forward.3) Next comes the problem of cadres both for industry
and for agriculture. Everybody is aware of the lack of technical experience
of our economic cadres, of our specialists, technicians and business executives.
The matter is complicated by the fact that a section of the specialists,
having connections with former owners and prompted from abroad, was found
to be at the head of the wrecking activities. The matter is still more
complicated by the fact that a number of our communist business executives
failed to display revolutionary vigilance and in many cases proved to be
under the ideological influence of the wrecker elements. Yet, we are faced
with the colossal task of reconstructing the whole of our national economy,
for which a large number of new cadres capable of mastering the new technology
is needed. In view of this, the problem of cadres has become a truly vital
problem for us.
This problem is being
solved by measures along the following lines: 
1) Resolute struggle
against wreckers; 
2) Maximum care and consideration
for the vast majority of specialists and technicians who have dissociated
themselves from the wreckers (I have in mind not windbags and poseurs of
the Ustryalov type, but the genuine scientific worker's who are working
honestly, hand in hand with the working class); 
3) the organisation of
technical aid from abroad; 
4) sending our business
executives abroad to study and generally to acquire technical experience; 
5) transferring technical
colleges to the respective economic organisations with a view to training
quickly a sufficient number of technicians and specialists from people
of working-class and peasant origin. 
The task is to develop
work for the realisation of these measures.
4) The problem
of combating bureaucracy. The danger of bureaucracy lies,
first of all, in that it keeps concealed the colossal reserves latent in
the depths of our system and prevents them from being utilised, in that
it strives to nullify the creative initiative of the masses, ties it hand
and foot with red tape and reduces every new undertaking by the Party to
petty and useless trivialities. The danger of bureaucracy lies, secondly,
in that it does not tolerate the checking of fulfilment and
strives to convert the basic directives of the leading organisations into
mere sheets of paper divorced from life. It is not only, and not so much,
the old bureaucrats stranded in our institutions who constitute this danger;
it is also, and particularly, the new bureaucrats, the Soviet bureaucrats;
and the "Communist" bureaucrats are by no means the least among them. I
have in mind those "Communists" who try to substitute bureaucratic orders
and "decrees," in the potency of which they believe as in a fetish, for
the creative initiative and independent activity of the vast masses of
the working class and peasantry.
The task is to smash bureaucracy in our institutions and organisations,
to get rid of bureaucratic "habits" and "customs" and to clear the way
for utilising the reserves of our social system, for developing the creative
initiative and independent activity of the masses.
That is not an easy task. It cannot be carried out "in a trice." But it
must be carried out at all costs if we really want to transform our country
on the basis of socialism.
In the struggle against bureaucracy, the Party is working along four lines:
that of developing self-criticism, that of organising
the checking of fulfilment,
that of purging the apparatus and,
lastly, that of promoting from below to posts
in the apparatus devoted workers from those of working-class origin.
The task is to exert every effort to carry out all these measures. 5) The problem
of increasing the productivity of labour. If there is not
a systematic increase in the productivity of labour both in industry and
agriculture we shall not be able to carry out the tasks of reconstruction,
we shall not only fail to overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist
countries, but we shall not even be able to maintain our independent existence.
Hence, the problem of increasing the productivity of labour is of prime
importance for us.
The Party's measures for solving this problem are along three lines: that
of systematically improving
the material conditions of
the working people, that of implanting comradely
labour discipline in
industrial and agricultural enterprises, and lastly, that of organising
socialist emulation
and shock-brigade
work. All
this is based on improved technology and the rational organisation of labour.
The task is to further develop the mass campaign for carrying out these
measures.
6) The problem of supplies. This includes the questions of
adequate supplies of necessary produce for the working people
in town and country, of adapting the co-operative apparatus to
the needs of the workers and peasants, of systematically raising the real
wages of the workers, of reducing prices of manufactured
goods and agricultural produce. I have already spoken about the shortcomings
of the consumers' co-operatives. These shortcomings must be eliminated
and we must see to it that the policy of reducing prices is
carried out. As regards the inadequate supply of goods (the "goods short-age"),
we are now in a position to enlarge the raw materials base of light industry
and increase the output of urban consumer goods. The bread supply can be
regarded as already assured. The situation is more difficult as regards
the supply of meat, dairy produce and vegetables. Unfortunately, this difficulty
cannot be removed within a few months. To overcome it will require at least
a year. In a year's time, thanks primarily to the organisation
of state farms and collective farms for this purpose, we shall be in a
position to ensure full supplies of meat, dairy produce and vegetables.
And what does controlling the supply of these products mean when we already
have grain reserves, textiles, increased housing construction for workers
and cheap municipal services? It means controlling all the principal factors
that determine the worker's budget and his real wages. It means guaranteeing
the rapid rise of workers' real wages surely and finally.
The task is to develop the work of all our organisations in this direction.
7) The problem of credits and currency. The rational organisation
of credit and correct manoeuvring with our financial reserves are of great
importance for the development of the national economy. The Party's measures
for solving this problem are along two lines:
That of concentrating
all short-term credit operations in the State Bank, and, 
That of organising non-cash
settlement of accounts in the socialised sector. 
This, firstly, transforms
the State Bank into a nation-wide apparatus for keeping account of tho
production and distribution of goods;
 and, secondly, it withdraws
a large amount of currency from circulation. There cannot be the slightest
doubt that these measures will introduce (are already introducing) order
in the entire credit system and strength-en our chervonets.8) The problem of reserves. It has already been stated several
times, and there is no need to repeat it, that a state in general, and
our state in particular, cannot do without reserves. We have some reserves
of grain, goods and foreign currency. During this period our comrades
have been able to feel the beneficial effects of these reserves. But "some"
reserves is not enough. We need bigger reserves in every direction.
Hence, the task is to accumulate reserves.
b) Industry
1) The chief problem is to force the development of the iron
and steel industry. You
must bear in mind that we have reached and are exceeding the pre-war level
of pig-iron output only this year, in 1929-30. This is a serious threat
to the whole of our national economy. To remove this threat we must force
the development of the iron and steel industry. By the end of the five-year
period we must reach an output not of 10,000,000 tons as is laid down in
the five-year plan, but of 15-17 million tons. We must achieve this aim
at all costs if we want really to develop the work of industrialising our
country.
Bolsheviks must show that they are able to cope with this task.
That does not mean, of course, that we must abandon light industry.
No, it does not mean that. Until now we have been economising in all things,
including light industry, in order to restore heavy industry. But we have
already restored heavy industry. Now it only needs to be developed further.
Now we can turn to light industry and push it forward at an accelerated
pace. One of the new features in the development of our industry is that
we are now in a position to develop both heavy and light industry at an
accelerated pace. The overfulfilment of the cotton, flax and sugar-beet
crop plans this year, and the solution
of the problem of kendyr and artificial silk, all this shows that we are
in a position really to push forward light industry.
2) The problem of rationalisation,
reducing production costs and
improving the quality
of production. We
can no longer tolerate defects in the sphere of rationalisation, non-fulfilment
of the plan to reduce production costs and the outrageous quality of the
goods turned out by a number of our enterprises. These gaps and defects
are harmfully affecting the whole of our national economy and hindering
it from making further progress. It is time, high time, that this disgraceful
stain was removed.
Bolsheviks must show
that they are able to cope with this task.3) The problem of one-man
management.
Infringements
in the sphere of introducing one-man management in the factories are also
becoming intolerable. Time and again the workers complain: "There is nobody
in control in the factory," "confusion reigns at work." We can no longer
allow our factories to be converted from organisms of production into parliaments.
Our Party and trade-union organisations must at last understand that unless
we ensure one-man management and establish strict responsibility for the
way the work proceeds we shall not be able to cope with the task of reconstructing
industry.


c) Agriculture 1) The
problem of livestock farming and industrial
crops. Now
that we have, in the main, solved the grain problem, we can set about solving
simultaneously both the livestock farming problem, which is a vital one
at the present time, and the industrial crops problem. In solving these
problems we must proceed along the same limes as we did in solving the
grain problem. That is to say, by organising state farms and collective
farms, which are the strong points for our policy, we must gradually transform
the technical and economic basis of present-day small-peasant livestock
farming and industrial crops growing. The Livestock Trust, the Sheep Trust,
the Pig Trust and the Dairy Trust, plus livestock collective farms, and
the existing state farms and collective farms which grow industrial crops
such are our points of departure for solving the problems that face us.
2) The problem of further
promoting the development of state farms and
collective farms.
It is scarcely necessary
to dwell at length on the point that for us this is the primary
problem of the whole
of our development in the countryside. Now, even the blind can see that
the peasants have made a tremendous, a radical turn from the old to the
new, from kulak bondage to free collective-farm life. There is no going
back to the old. The kulaks are doomed and will be eliminated. Only one
path remains, the collective-farm path. And the collective-farm path is
no longer for us an unknown and unexplored path. It has been explored and
tried in a thousand ways by the peasant masses themselves. It has been
explored and appraised as a new path that leads the peasants to emancipation
from kulak bondage, from want and ignorance. That is the basis of our achievements.
How will the new movement in the countryside develop further? In the forefront
will be the state farms as the backbone of the reorganisation of the old
way of life
in the countryside. They will be followed by the numerous collective farms,
as the strong points of the new movement in the countryside. The combined
work of these two systems will create the conditions for the complete collectivisation
of all the regions in the USSR.
One of the
most remarkable achievements of the collective-farm movement is that it
has already brought to the forefront thousands of organisers
and tens of thousands
of agitators
in favour of collective
farms from among the peasants
themselves. Not
we alone, the skilled Bolsheviks, but the collective-farm peasants themselves,
tens of thousands of peasant organisers of collective farms and agitators
in favour of them will now carry forward the banner of collectivisation.
And the peasant agitators are splendid agitators for the collective-farm
movement, for they will find arguments in favour of collective farms, intelligible
and acceptable to the rest of the peasant masses, of which we skilled Bolsheviks
cannot even dream.
Here and there voices are heard saying that we must abandon the policy
of complete collectivisation. We have information that there are advocates
of this "idea" even in our Party. That can be said, however, only by people
who, voluntarily or involuntarily, have joined forces with the enemies
of communism. The method of complete collectivisation is that essential
method without which it will be impossible to carry out the five-year plan
for the collectivisation of all the regions of the USSR How can it
be abandoned without betraying communism, without betraying the interests
of the working class and peasantry?
This does not mean, of course, that everything will go "smoothly" and "normally"
for us in the collective farm movement. There will still be vacillation
within the collective farms. There will still be flows and ebbs. But this
cannot and must not daunt the builders of the collective-farm movement.
Still less can it serve as a serious obstacle to the powerful development
of the collective-farm movement. A sound movement, such as our collective-farm
movement undoubtedly is, will achieve its goal in spite of everything,
in spite of individual obstacles and difficulties.
The task is to train the forces and to arrange for the further development
of the collective-farm movement.
3) The problem of bringing
the apparatus as
close as possible to the
districts and villages. There
can be no doubt that we would have been unable to cope with the enormous
task of reconstructing agriculture and of developing the collective-farm
movement had we not carried out redelimitation
of administrative areas. The
enlargement of the volosts and their transformation into districts, the
abolition of gubernias and their transformation into smaller units (okrugs),
and lastly, the formation of regions as direct strong points of the Central
Committee—such are the general features of this redelimitation. Its object
is to bring the Party and Soviet and the economic and co-operative apparatus
closer to the districts and villages in order to make possible the timely
solution of the vexed questions of agriculture, of its upswing, of its
reconstruction. In this sense, I repeat, the redelimitation of administrative
areas has been of immense benefit to the whole of our development.
But has everything been done to bring the apparatus really and effectively
closer to the districts and villages? No, not everything. The centre of
gravity of collective-farm development has now shifted to the district
organisations. They are the centres on which converge all the threads of
collective-farm development and of all other economic work in the countryside,
as regards both co-operatives and Soviets, credits and procurements. Are
the district organisations adequately supplied with the workers they need,
and must have, to cope with all these diverse tasks? There can be no doubt
that they are extremely inadequately staffed. What is the way out? What
must be done to correct this defect and to supply the district organisations
with a sufficient number of the workers required for all branches of our
work?At least two things must
be done:
1) abolish the okrugs (applause), which
are becoming an unnecessary barrier between the region and the districts,
and use the released okrug personnel to strengthen the district organisations; 
2) link the district organisations
directly with the region (Territorial Committee, national Central Committee).That will complete the redelimitation of administrative areas, complete
the process of bringing the apparatus closer to the districts and villages. There was
applause here at the prospect of abolishing the okrugs. Of course, the
okrugs must be abolished. It would be a mistake, however, to think that
this gives us the right to decry the okrugs, as some comrades do in the
columns of Pravda. It must not be forgotten that the okrugs have
shouldered the burden of tremendous work, and in their time played a great
historical role. (Applause.) I also think
that it would be a mistake to display too much haste in abolishing the
okrugs. The Central Committee has adopted a decision to abolish the okrugs.
(Original Footnote: The decision of the CC.,
CPSU(B) on "The Abolition of Okrugs" was published in Pravda, No.
194, July 16, 1930).It is not at all of the opinion, however, that
this must be done immediately. Obviously, the necessary preparatory work
must be carried out before the okrugs are abolished.


d) Transport
Lastly, the transport problem. There is
no need to dwell at length on the enormous importance of transport for
the whole of the national economy. And not only for the national economy.
As you know, transport is of the utmost importance also for the defence
of the country. In spite of the enormous importance of transport, however,
the transport system, the reconstruction of this system, still lags behind
the general rate of development. Does it need to be proved that in such
a situation we run the risk of transport becoming a "bottle-neck" in the
national economy, capable of retarding our progress? Is it not time to
put an end to this situation?
Matters are particularly bad as regards river transport. It is a fact that
the Volga steamship service has barely reached 60 per cent, and the Dnieper
steamship service 40 per cent, of the pre-war level. Sixty and forty per
cent of the pre-war level—this is all that river transport can enter
in its record of "achievements." A big "achievement" to be sure! Is it
not time to put an end to this disgrace? (Voices: "It
is.")
The task is to tackle the transport problem, at last, in the Bolshevik
manner and to get ahead with it. Such are the Party's next tasks. What is needed to carry out these tasks?
Primarily and chiefly, what is needed is to continue the sweeping offensive
against the capitalist elements along the whole front and to
carry it through to the end.
That is the centre and basis of our policy at the present time. (Applause.)
I pass to the question of the Party.
I have spoken about the advantages of the Soviet system of economy over
the capitalist system. I have spoken about the colossal possibilities that
our social system affords us in fighting for the complete victory of socialism.
I said that without these possibilities, without utilising them, we could
not have achieved the successes gained by us in the past period.
But the question arises: has the Party been able to make proper use of
the possibilities afforded us by the Soviet system; has it not kept these
possibilities concealed, thereby preventing the working class from fully
developing its revolutionary might; has it been able to squeeze out of
these possibilities all that could be squeezed out of them for the purpose
of promoting socialist construction along the whole front?
The Soviet system provides colossal
possibilities
for the complete
victory of socialism. But possibility
is not actuality.
To transform possibility
into actuality a number of conditions are needed, among which the Party's
line and the correct carrying out of this line play by no means the least
role.
Some examples.
The Right opportunists assert that NEP guarantees us the victory of socialism;
therefore, there is no need to worry about the rate of industrialisation,
about developing state farms and collective farms, and so forth, because
the arrival of victory is assured in any case, automatically, so to speak.
That, of course, is wrong and absurd. To speak like that means denying
the Party a role in the building of socialism, denying the Party's responsibility
for the work of building socialism. Lenin by no means said that NEP guarantees
us the victory of socialism. Lenin merely said that "economically and politically,
NEP fully ensures us the possibility
of laying the foundation
of a socialist economy." (Original
Footnote: V. I. Lenin, Letter to V. M. Molotov on a Plan for the Political
Report to the Eleventh Party Congress (see Works, 4th
Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 223-24.)
But possibility is not yet actuality.
To convert possibility
into actuality we must first of all cast aside the opportunist theory of
things going of their own accord, we must re-build (reconstruct) our national
economy and conduct a determined offensive against the capitalist elements
in town and country.The Right opportunists
assert, further, that there are no grounds inherent in our social system
for a split between the working class and the peasantry-consequently we
need not worry about establishing a correct policy in regard to the social
groups in the countryside, because the kulaks will grow into socialism
in any case, and the alliance of the workers and peasants will be guaranteed
automatically, so to speak. That, too, is wrong and absurd. Such a thing
can be said only by people who fail to understand that the policy of the
Party, and especially because it is a party that is in power, is the chief
factor that determines the fate of the alliance of the workers and peasants.
Lenin by no means considered that the danger of a split between the working
class and the peasantry was out of the question. Lenin said that "the grounds
for such a split are not necessarily inherent in our social
system," but "if serious class disagreements arise
between these classes, a split will be inevitable."In view of
this, Lenin considered that:
'The chief task of our
Central Committee and Central Control Commission, as well as of our Party
as a whole, is to watch very closely for the circumstances that may cause
a split and to forestall them;
for, in the last resort, the fate of our Republic will depend on whether
the masses of the peasants march with the working class and keep true to
the alliance with it, or whether they permit the 'Nepmen,' i.e., the new
bourgeoisie, to drive a wedge between them and the workers, to split them
off from the workers." (Original Footnote: V.I. Lenin,
"How to Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection" (see Works,
4th Russ. ed., Vol.33, p.444).Consequently, a split between the working class and the peasantry is not
precluded, but it is not at all inevitable, for inherent in our social
system is the possibility of
preventing such a split and of strengthening the alliance of the working
class and peasantry. What is needed to convert this possibility into actuality?
To convert the possibility of preventing
a split into actuality
we must first of all bury the opportunist theory of things going of their
own accord, tear out the roots of capitalism by orgallising collective
farms and state farms, and pass from the policy of restricting the exploit
mg tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as
a class.
It follows, therefore, that a strict distinction must be drawn between
the possibilities
inherent in our social
system and the utilisation
of these possibilities,
the conversion of these possibilities into actuality.
It follows that cases are quite conceivable when the possibilities of victory
exist, but the Party does not see them, or is incapable of utilising them
properly, with the result that instead of victory there may come defeat.
And so the same question arises: Has the Party been able to make proper
use of the possibilities and advantages afforded us by the
Soviet system? Has it done everything to convert
these possibilities into actuality and thus guarantee the maximum success for our work of construction?
In other words: Has the Party and its Central Committee correctly guided
the building of socialism in the past period?
What is needed for correct leadership by the Party under our present conditions?For correct
leadership by the Party it is necessary, apart from everything else, that
the Party should have a correct line; that the masses should understand
that the Party's line is correct and should actively support it; that the
Party should not confine itself to drawing up a general line, but should
day by day guide the carrying out of this line; that the Party should wage
a determined struggle against deviations from the general line and against
conciliation towards such deviations; that in the struggle against deviations
the Party should forge the unity of its ranks and iron discipline.What has the
Party and its Central Committee done to fulfil these conditions? a) The Party's
principal line at the present moment is transition from the
offensive of socialism on separate sectors of the economic
front to an offensive along the whole front both in industry
and in agriculture.The Fourteenth
Congress was mainly the congress of industrialisation. The Fifteenth
Congress was mainly the congress of collectivisation.
This was the preparation for the general offensive.As distinct
from the past stages, the period before the Sixteenth Congress was a period
of the general offensive of socialism along the whole
Front, a period of intensified socialist construction both in industry
and in agriculture.The Sixteenth
Congress of the Party is the congress of the sweeping offensive
of socialism along the whole front, of
the elimination of the kulaks as a class, and of the realisation of complete
collectivisation.There you have
in a few words the essence of our Party's general line.
Is this line correct?
 Yes, it is correct.
The facts show that our Party's general line is the only correct line.
(Applause.)This is proved
by our successes and achievements on the front of socialist construction.
It was not and cannot be the case that the decisive victory won by the
Party on the front of socialist construction in town and country during
the past period was the result of an incorrect policy. Only a correct general
line could give us such a victory.It is proved
by the frenzied howl against our Party's policy raised lately by our class
enemies, the capitalists and their press, the Pope and bishops of all kinds,
the Social-Democrats and the "Russian" Mensheviks of the Abramovich and
Dan type. The capitalists and their lackeys are abusing our Party—that
is a sign that our Party's general line is correct. (Applause.)It is proved
by the fate of Trotskyism, with which everybody is now familiar. The gentlemen
in the Trotsky camp chattered about the "degeneration" of the Soviet regime,
about "Thermidor," about the "inevitable victory" of Trotskyism, and so
forth. But, actually, what happened? What happened was the collapse, the
end of Trotskyism. One section of the Trotskyists, as is known, broke away
from Trotskyism and in numerous declarations of its representatives admitted
that the Party was right, and acknowledged the counter-revolutionary character
of Trotskyism. Another section of the Trotskyists really degenerated into
typical petty-bourgeois counter-revolutionaries, and actually became an
information bureau of the capitalist press on matters concerning the CPSU(B).
But the Soviet regime, which was to have "degenerated" (or "had already
degenerated"), continues to thrive and to build socialism, successfully
breaking the backbone of the capitalist elements in our country and their
petty-bourgeois yes-men.It is
proved by the fate of the Right deviators, with which everybody is now
familiar. They chattered and howled about the Party line being "fatal,"
about the "probable catastrophe" in the USSR, about the necessity of
"saving" the country from the Party and its leadership, and so forth. But
what actually happened? What actually happened was that the Party achieved
gigantic successes on all the fronts of socialist construction, whereas
the group of Right deviators, who wanted to "save" the country but who
later admitted that they were wrong, are now left high and dry.It is proved
by the growing revolutionary activity of the working class and peasantry,
by the active support for the Party's policy by the vast masses of the
working people, and lastly, by that unprecedented labour enthusiasm of
the workers and peasant collective farmers, the immensity of which astonishes
both the friends and the enemies of our country. That is apart from such
signs of the growth of confidence in the Party as the applications from
workers to join the Party in whole shops and factories, the growth of the
Party membership between the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Congresses by over
600,000, and the 200,000 new members who joined the Party in the first
quarter of this year alone. What does all this show if not that the vast
masses of the working people realise that our Party's policy is correct
and are ready to support it?It must be
admitted that these facts would not have existed if our Party's general
line had not been the only correct one.b) But the
Party cannot confine itself to drawing up a general line. It must also,
from day to day, keep check on how the general line is being carried out
in practice. It must guide the carrying out of the general line, improving
and perfecting the adopted plans of economic development in the course
of the work, and correcting and preventing mistakes. How has
the Central Committee of our Party performed this work?The Central
Committee's work in this sphere has proceeded mainly along the line of
amending and giving precision to the five-year plan by accelerating tempo
and shortening time schedules, along the line of checking the economic
organisations' fulfilment of the assignments laid down.Here are a
few of the principal decisions adopted by the Central Committee amending
the five-year plan in the direction of speeding up the rate of development
and shortening time schedules of fulfilment. In the
iron and steel industry: the five-year
plan provides for the output of pig-iron to be brought up to 10,000,000
tons in the last year of the five-year period; the Central Committee's
decision, however, found that this level is not sufficient, and laid it
down that in the last year of the five-year period the output of pig-iron
must be brought up to 17,000,000 tons. Tractor
construction: the
five-year plan provides for the output of tractors to be brought up to
55,000 in the last year of the five-year period; the Central Committee's
decision, however, found that this target is not sufficient, and laid it
down that the output of tractors in the last year of the five-year period
must be brought up to 170,000. The same must
be said about automobile construction: where, instead
of an output of 100,000 cars (lorries and passenger cars) in the last year
of the five-year period as provided for in the five-year plan, it was decided
to bring it up to 200,000.The same applies
to non-ferrous metallurgy: where the
five-year plan estimates were raised by more than 100 per cent; and to agricultural
machine-building, where the
five-year plan estimates were also raised by over 100 per cent.That is apart
from harvester-combine building, for which no provision at
all was made in the five-year
plan, and the output of which must he brought up to at least 40,000 in
the last year of the five-year period State-farm
development: the five-year
plan provides for the expansion of the crop area to be brought up to 5,000,000
hectares by the end of the five-year period; the Central Committee's decision,
however, found that this level was not sufficient and laid it down that
by the end of the five-year period the state-farm crop area must be brought
up to 18,000,000 hectares. Collective-farm
development: the five-year
plan provides for the expansion of the crop area to be brought up to 20,000,000
hectares by the end of the five-year period; the Central Committee's decision,
however, found that this level was obviously not sufficient (it has already
been exceeded this year) and laid it down that by the end of the five-year
period the collectivisation of the USSR should, in the main, be completed,
and by that time the collective-farm crop area should cover nine-tenths
of the crop area of the USSR now cultivated by individual farmers.
(Applause.)And so on and so forth.Such, in general,
is the picture of the way the Central Committee is guiding the carrying
out of the Party's general line, the planning of socialist construction.It may be said
that in altering the estimates of the five-year plan so radically the Central
Committee is violating the principle of planning and is discrediting the
planning organisations. But only hopeless bureaucrats can talk like that.
For us Bolsheviks, the five-year plan is not something fixed once and for
all. For us the five-year plan, like every other, is merely a plan adopted
as a first approximation, which has to be made more precise, altered and
perfected in conformity with the experience gained in the localities, with
the experience gained in carrying out the plan. No five-year plan can take
into account all the possibilities latent in the depths of our system and
which reveal themselves only in the course of the work, in the course of
carrying out the plan in the factory and mill, in the collective farm and
state farm, in the district, and so forth. Only bureaucrats can think that
the work of planning ends with the drafting of a plan. The
drafting of a plan is only the beginning of planning. Real
guidance in planning develops only after the plan bas been drafted, after
it has been tested in the localities, in the course of carrying it out,
correcting it and making it more precise.That is why
the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, jointly with
the planning bodies of the Republic, deemed it necessary to correct and
improve the five-year plan on the basis of experience, in the direction
of speeding up the rate of development and shortening time schedules of
fulfilment.Here is what
Lenin said about the principle of planning and guidance in planning at
the Eighth Congress of Soviets, when the ten-year plan of the GOELRO (Original
Footnote: The Eighth Congress of Soviets of the R.S.F.S.R. was held December
22-29, 1920. One of the principal questions at the congress was the plan
for the electrification of the country, prepared by the State Commission
on the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO). In its decision. the congress
assessed the electrification plan "as the first step of a great economic
undertaking." In a letter to V.I. Lenin in March 1921, J. V. Stalin wrote
about the plan for the electrification of Russia:
"During the last three days I have
had the opportunity to read the symposium: 'A Plan for the Electrification
of Russia.'. . . An excellent, well-compiled book. A masterly
draft of a really single and really state economic
plan, not in quotation marks. The only
Marxist attempt in our time to place the Soviet super-structure
of economically backward Russia in a really practical technical and production
basis, the only possible one under present conditions". (see J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol.
5, p.50) was being discussed:"Our Party programme cannot remain merely a Party programme.
It must become the programme of our economic work of construction, otherwise
it is useless even as a Party programme. It must be supplemented by a second
Party programme, by a plan for the restoration of our entire national economy
and for raising it to the level of modern technology. . . We must come
to the point of adopting a certain plan; of course, this will be a plan
adopted only as a first approximation. This Party programme will not be
as unalterable as our actual Party programme, which can be altered only
at Party congresses. No, this programme will be improved, worked out, perfected
and altered every day, in every workshop, in every volost. . . Watching
the experience of science and practice, the people of the localities must
undeviatingly strive to get the plan carried out earlier than had been
provided for, in order that the masses may see that the long period that
separates us from the complete restoration of industry can be shortened
by experience. This depends upon us. Let us in every workshop, in every
railway depot, in every sphere, improve our economy, and then we shall
reduce the period. And we are already reducing it"
(Vol. XXVI, pp. 45, 46, 43).As you see,
the Central Committee has followed the path indicated by Lenin, altering
and improving the five-year plan, shortening time schedules and speeding
up the rate of development.On what possibilities
did the Central Committee rely when speeding up the rate of development
and shortening the time schedules for carrying out the five-year plan?
On the reserves latent in the depths of our system and revealed only in
the course of the work, on the possibilities afforded us by the reconstruction
period. The Central Committee is of the opinion that the reconstruction
of the technical basis of industry and agriculture under the socialist
organisation of production creates such possibilities of accelerating
tempo as no capitalist country can dream of.These circumstances
alone can explain the fact that during the past three years our socialist
industry has more than doubled its output and that the output of this industry
in 1930-31 should be 47 per cent above that of the current year, while
the volume of this increase alone will he equal to the volume
of output of the entire pre-war large-scale industry.These circumstances
alone can explain the fact that the five-year plan of state-farm development
is being overfulfilled in three years, while that of collective-farm development
has already been overfulfilled in two years.

There is a
theory according to which high rates of development are possible only in
the restoration period and that with the transition to the reconstruction
period the rate of development must diminish sharply year by year. This
theory is called the theory of the "descending curve." It is a theory for
justifying our backwardness. It has nothing in common with Marxism, with
Leninism. It is a bourgeois theory, designed to perpetuate the backwardness
of our country. Of the people who have had, or have, connection with our
Party, only the Trotskyists and Right deviators uphold and preach this
theory.There exists
an opinion that the Trotskyists are super-industrialists. But this opinion
is only partly correct. It is correct only insofar as it applies to the
end of the restoration period, when the Trotskyists did,
indeed, develop super-industrialist fantasies. As regards the reconstruction
period, however, the Trotskyists, on the question of tempo, are
the most extreme minimalists and the most wretched capitulators. (Laughter.
Applause.)In their platforms
and declarations the Trotskyists gave no figures concerning tempo, they
confined themselves to general chatter about tempo. But there is one document
in which the Trotskyists did depict in figures their understanding of the
rate of development of state industry. I am referring to the memorandum
of the "Special Conference on the Restoration of Fixed Capital" of state
industry (OSVOK) drawn up on the principles of Trotskyism. It will be interesting
briefly to analyse this document, which dates back to 1925-26. It will
be interesting to do so, because it fully reflects the Trotskyist scheme
of the descending curve.
According to this document, it was proposed to invest
in state industry: 1,543,000,000 rubles in 1926-27; 1,490,000,000 rubles in 1927-28; 1,320,000,000 rubles in 1928-29; 1,060,000,000 rubles in 4929-30 (at 1926-27 prices). Such is the picture of the descending Trotskyist curve.But how much
did we actually invest? Actually we invested in state industry: 1,065,000,000
rubles in 1926-27; 1,304,000,000
rubles in 1927-28; 1,819,000,000
rubles in 1929; 4,775,000,000
rubles in 4929-30 (at 1926-27 prices).
Such is the
picture of the ascending Bolshevik curve.According to this (Trotskyite-Editor) document, the output
of state industry was to increase by:
 31.6 per cent in 1926-27;
 by 22.9 per cent in 4927-28;
 by 15.5 per cent in 4928-29;
 by 15 per cent in 1929-30.
 Such is the picture of the descending Trotskyist
curve.But what actually happened? Actually, the increase in
the output of state industry was:
19.7 per cent in 1926-27;
26.3 per cent in 1927-28;
24.3 per cent in 1928-29;
32 per cent in 1929-30,
and in 1930-31 the increase will amount to 47 per cent.
Such is the picture of the ascending Bolshevik
curve.As you know, Trotsky specially advocates this defeatist theory
of the descending curve in his pamphlet Towards Socialism or Capitalism?
He plainly says there that since: 
"Before the war, the expansion of industry consisted,
in the main, in the construction of new factories, "whereas "in our times
expansion, to a much larger degree, consists in utilising the old factories
and in keeping the old equipment running," therefore, it "naturally follows
that with the completion of the restoration process the coefficient
of growth must considerably diminish" and so he proposes
that "during the next few years the coefficient of industrial growth be
raised not only to twice, but to three times the pre-war 6 per cent, and
perhaps even higher."Thus, three times six per cent annual increase of industry.
How much does that amount to? Only to an increase of 18 per cent per annum.
Hence, 18 per cent annual increase in the output of state industry is,
in the opinion of the Trotskyists, the highest limit that can be reached
in planning to accelerate development in the reconstruction period,
to be striven for as the ideal. Compare this pettifogging sagacity
of the Trotskyists with the actual increase in output that we have had
during the last three years: 
(1927-28 — 26.3 per cent, 
1928-29 — 24.3 per cent, 
1929-30 — 32 per cent); Compare this defeatist
philosophy of the Trotskyists with the estimates in the control figures
of the State Planning Commission for 1930-31 of a 47 per cent increase,
which exceeds the highest rate of increase of output in the
restoration period, and you will realise how utterly reactionary
is the Trotskyist theory of the "descending curve," the utter lack of faith
of the Trotskyists in the possibilities of the reconstruction
period.That is why
the Trotskyists are now singing about the "excessive" Bolshevik rates of
industrial and collective-farm development.That is why
the Trotskyists cannot now be distinguished from our Right deviators.Naturally,
if we had not shattered the Trotskyist-Right-deviation theory of the "descending
curve," we should not have been able either to develop real planning or
to accelerate tempo and shorten time schedules of development. In order
to guide the carrying out of the Party's general line, to correct and improve
the five-year plan of development, to accelerate tempo and to pre-vent
mistakes in the work of construction, it was necessary first of all to
shatter and liquidate the reactionary theory of the "descending curve."That is what
the Central Committee did, as I have already said. It may be thought
that the work of guiding socialist construction, the work of carrying out
the Party's general line, has proceeded in our Party calmly and smoothly,
without struggle or tense effort of will. But that is not 50, comrades.
Actually, this work has proceeded amid a struggle against inner-Party difficulties,
amid a struggle against all sorts of deviations from Leninism both as regards
general policy and as regards the national question. Our Party does not
live and operate in a vacuum. It lives and operates in the thick of life
and is subjected to the influence of the surrounding environment. And our
environment, as you know, consists of different classes and social groups.
We have launched a sweeping offensive against the capitalist elements,
we have pushed our socialist industry far forward, we have widely developed
the formation of state farms and collective farms. Events like these, however,
cannot but affect the exploiting classes. These events are usually accompanied
by the ruin of the moribund classes, by the ruin of the kulaks in the country-side,
by the restriction of the field of activity of the petty-bourgeois strata
in the towns. Naturally, all this cannot but intensify the class struggle,
the resistance of the moribund classes to the Soviet government's policy.
It would be ridiculous to think that the resistance of these classes will
not find reflection in some way or other in the ranks of our Party. And
it does indeed find reflection in the Party. All the various deviations
from the Leninist line in the ranks of our Party are a reflection of the
resistance of the moribund classes.Is it possible
to wage a successful struggle against class enemies without at the same
time combating deviations in our Party, without overcoming these deviations?
No, it is not. That is because it is impossible to develop a real struggle
against class enemies while having their agents in our rear, while leaving
in our rear people who have no faith in our cause, and who strive in every
way to hinder our progress.Hence an uncompromising
struggle against deviations from the Leninist line is an immediate task
of the Party.Why is the
Right deviation the chief danger in the Party at the present time? Because
it reflects the kulak danger; and at the present moment, the moment of
the sweeping offensive and the tearing out of the roots of capitalism,
the kulak danger is the chief danger in the country.What did the
Central Committee have to do to over-come the Right deviation, to deliver
the finishing stroke to the "Left" deviation and clear the way for rallying
the Party to the utmost around the Leninist line?a) It had,
first of all, to put an end to the remnants of Trotskyism in the Party,
to the survivals of the Trotskyist theory. We had long ago routed the Trotskyist
group as an opposition, and had expelled it. The Trotskyist group is now
an anti-proletarian and anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary group, which
is zealously informing the bourgeoisie about the affairs of our Party.
But the remnants of the Trotskyist theory, the survivals of Trotskyism,
have not yet been completely swept out of the Party. Hence, the first thing
to be done was to put an end to these survivals.What is the
essence of Trotskyism?The essence
of Trotskyism is, first of all, denial of the possibility of completely
building socialism in the USSR by the efforts of the working class
and peasantry of our country. What does this mean? It means that if a victorious
world revolution does not come to our aid in the near future, we shall
have to surrender to the bourgeoisie and clear the way for a bourgeois-democratic
republic. Consequently, we have here the bourgeois denial of the possibility
of completely building socialism in our country, disguised by "revolutionary"
phrases about the victory of the world revolution.Is it possible,
while holding such views, to rouse the labour enthusiasm of the vast masses
of the working class, to rouse them for socialist emulation, for mass shock-brigade
work, for a sweeping offensive against the capitalist elements? Obviously
not. It would be foolish to think that our working class, which has made
three revolutions, will display labour enthusiasm and engage in mass shock-brigade
work in order to manure the soil for capitalism. Our working class is displaying
labour enthusiasm not for the sake of capitalism, but in order to bury
capitalism once and for all and to build socialism in the USSR Take
from it its confidence in the possibility of building socialism, and you
will completely destroy the basis for emulation, for labour enthusiasm,
for shock-brigade work.Hence the conclusion: in order to
rouse labour enthusiasm and emulation among the working class and to organise
a sweeping offensive, it was necessary, first of all, to bury the bourgeois
theory of Trotskyism that it is impossible to build socialism in our country.The essence
of Trotskyism is, secondly, denial of the possibility of drawing the main
mass of the peasantry into the work of socialist construction in the country-side.
What does this mean? It means that the working class is incapable of leading
the peasantry in the work of transferring the individual peasant farms
to collectivist lines, that if the victory of the world revolution does
not come to the aid of the working class in the near future, the peasantry
will restore the old bourgeois order. Consequently, we have here the bourgeois
denial of the capacity or possibility of the proletarian dictatorship to
lead the peasantry to socialism, disguised by a mask of "revolutionary"
phrases about the victory of the world revolution.Is it possible,
while holding such views, to rouse the peasant masses for the collective-farm
movement, to organise a mass collective-farm movement, to organise the
elimination of the kulaks as a class? Obviously not.Hence the conclusion:
in order to organise a mass collective-farm movement of the peasantry and
to eliminate the kulaks, it was necessary, first of all, to bury the bourgeois
theory of Trotskyism that it is impossible to bring the labouring masses
of the peasantry to socialism.The essence
of Trotskyism is, lastly, denial of the necessity for iron discipline in
the Party, recognition of freedom for factional groupings in the Party,
recognition of the need to form a Trotskyist party. According to Trotskyism,
the CPSU(B) must be not a single, united militant party, but a collection
of groups and factions, each with its own centre, its own discipline, its
own press, and so forth. What does this mean? It means proclaiming freedom
for political factions in the Party. It means that freedom for political
groupings in the Party must be followed by freedom for political parties
in the country, i.e., bourgeois democracy. Consequently, we have here recognition
of freedom for factional groupings in the Party right up to permitting
political parties in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat, disguised
by phrases about "inner-party democracy,', about "improving the regime"
in the Party. That freedom for factional squabbling of groups of intellectuals
is not inner-party democracy, that the widely-developed self-criticism
conducted by the Party and the colossal activity of the mass of the Party
membership is real and genuine inner-party democracy—Trotskyism cannot
understand.Is it possible,
while holding such views about the Party, to ensure iron discipline in
the Party, to ensure the iron unity of the Party that is essential for
waging a successful struggle against class enemies? Obviously not.Hence the conclusion:
in order to guarantee the iron unity of the Party and proletarian discipline
in it, it was necessary, first of all, to bury the Trotskyist theory of
organisation.Capitulation
in practice as the content, "Left" phrases and "revolutionary"
adventurist postures, as the form disguising and advertising
the defeatist content—such is the essence of Trotskyism.This duality
of Trotskyism reflects the duality of the position of the urban petty bourgeoisie,
which is being ruined, cannot tolerate the "regime" of the dictatorship
of the proletariat and is striving either to jump into socialism "at one
go" in order to avoid being ruined (hence adventurism and
hysterics in policy), or, if this is impossible, to make
every conceivable concession to capitalism (hence capitulation
in policy).This duality
of Trotskyism explains why it usually crowns its supposedly "furious" attacks
on the Right deviators by a bloc with them, as undisguised
capitulators.And what are
the "Left" excesses that have occurred in the Party in connection with
the collective-farm movement? They represent
a certain attempt, true an unconscious one, to revive among us the traditions
of Trotskyism in practice, to revive the Trotskyist attitude towards the
middle peasantry. They are the result of that mistake in policy which Lenin
called "over-administration." This means that some of our comrades, infatuated
by the successes of the collective-farm movement, began to approach the
problem of collective-farm development not as builders, but mainly as administrators
and, as a result, committed a number of very gross mistakes.
There are people in our Party who think that the "Left" distorters should
not have been pulled up. They think that our officials should not have
been taken to task and their infatuation should not have been counteracted
even though it led to mistakes. That is nonsense, comrades. Only people
who are determined to swim with the stream, can talk like that. These are
the very same people who can never understand the Leninist policy of going
against the stream when the situation demands it, when the interests of
the Party demand it. They are khvostists, not Leninists. The reason why
the Party succeeded in turning whole detachments of our comrades on to
the right road, the reason why the Party succeeded in rectifying mistakes
and achieving successes is just because it resolutely went against the
stream in order to carry out the Party's general line. That is Leninism
in practice, Leninism in leadership.
That is why I think that if we had not overcome the "Left" excesses we
could not have achieved the successes in the collective-farm movement that
we have now achieved.
That is how matters stand as regards the struggle against the survivals
of Trotskyism and against the recurrence of them in practice.
Matters are somewhat different as regards Right opportunism, which was,
or is, headed by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky.
It cannot be said that the Right deviators do not admit the possibility
of completely building socialism in the USSR No, they do admit it,
and that is what distinguishes them from the Trotskyists. But the misfortune
of the Right deviators is that, while formally admitting that it is possible
to build socialism in one country, they refuse to recognise the ways and
means of struggle without which it is impossible to build socialism. They
refuse to admit that the utmost development of industry is the key to the
transformation of the entire national economy on the basis of socialism.
They refuse to admit the uncompromising class struggle against the capitalist
elements and the sweeping offensive of socialism against capitalism. They
fail to understand that all these ways and means constitute the system
of measures without which it is impossible to retain the dictatorship of
the proletariat and to build socialism in our country. They think that
socialism can be built on the quiet, automatically, without class struggle,
without an offensive against the capitalist elements. They think that the
capitalist elements will either die out imperceptibly or grow into socialism.
As, however, such miracles do not happen in history, it follows that the
Right deviators are in fact slipping into the viewpoint of
denying the possibility of completely building socialism in our country.
Nor can it be said that the Right deviators deny that it is possible to
draw the main mass of the peasantry into the work of building socialism
in the countryside. No, they admit that it is possible, and that is what
distinguishes them from the Trotskyists. But while admitting it formally,
they will not accept the ways and means without which it is impossible
to draw the peasantry into the work of building socialism. They refuse
to admit that state farms and collective farms are the principal means
and the "high road" for drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the
work of building socialism. They refuse to admit that unless the policy
of eliminating the kulaks as a class is carried out it will be impossible
to transform the countryside on the basis of socialism. They think that
the countryside can be transferred to socialist lines on the quiet, automatically,
without class struggle, merely with the aid of supply and marketing co-operatives,
for they are convinced that the kulaks themselves will grow into socialism.
They think that the chief thing now is not a high rate of industrial development,
and not collective farms and state farms, but to "release" the elemental
forces of the market, to "emancipate" the market and to "remove the shackles"
from the individual farms, up to and including those of the capitalist
elements in the countryside. As, however, the kulaks cannot grow into socialism,
and "emancipating" the market means arming the kulaks and disarming the
working class, it follows that the Right deviators are in
fact slipping into the viewpoint
of denying that it is possible to draw
the main mass of the peasantry into the work of building socialism.
It is this, really, that explains why the Right deviators usually crown
their sparring with the Trotskyists by backstairs negotiations with them
on the subject of a bloc with them.
The chief evil of Right opportunism is that it breaks with the Leninist
conception of the class struggle and slips into the viewpoint of petty-bourgeois
liberalism.
There can be no doubt that the victory of the Right deviation in our Party
would have meant completely disarming the working class, arming the capitalist
elements in the countryside and increasing the chances of the restoration
of capitalism in the USSR.
The Right deviators do not take the stand of forming another party, and
that is another thing that distinguishes them from the Trotskyists. The
leaders of the Right deviators have openly admitted their mistakes and
have surrendered to the Party. But it would be foolish to think, on these
grounds, that the Right deviation is already buried. The strength of Right
opportunism is not measured by this circumstance. The strength of Right
opportunism lies in the strength of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces,
in the strength of the pressure on the Party exercised by the capitalist
elements in general, and by the kulaks in particular. And it is precisely
because the Right deviation reflects the resistance of the chief elements
of the moribund classes that the Right deviation is the principal danger
in the Party at the present time.
That is why the Party considered it necessary to wage a determined and
uncompromising struggle against the Right deviation.
There can be no doubt that if we had not waged a determined struggle against
the Right deviation, if we had not isolated its leading elements, we would
not have succeeded in mobilising the forces of the Party and of the working
class, in mobilising the forces of the poor- and middle-peasant masses,
for the sweeping offensive of socialism, for the organisation of state
farms and collective farms, for the restoration of our heavy industry,
for the elimination of the kulaks as a class.
That is how matters stand as regards the "Left" and Right deviations in
the Party.
The task is to continue the uncompromising struggle on two
fronts, against
the "Lefts," who represent petty-bourgeois radicalism,
and against the Rights,
who re-present petty-bourgeois liberalism.
The task is to continue the uncompromising
struggle against
those conciliatory elements
in the Party who fail to understand, or pretend they do not understand,
the necessity of a determined struggle on two fronts.
b) The picture of the struggle against deviations in the Party will not
be complete if we do not touch upon the deviations that exist in the Party
on the national question. I
have in mind, firstly, the deviation towards Great-Russian chauvinism,
and secondly, the deviation towards local nationalism. These deviations
are not so conspicuous and assertive as the "Left" or the Right deviation.
They could be called creeping deviations. But this does not mean that they
do not exist. They do exist, and what is most important they are growing.
There can be no doubt whatever about that. There can be no doubt about
it, because the general atmosphere of more acute class struggle cannot
fail to cause some intensification of national friction, which finds reflection
in the Party. Therefore, the features of these deviations should be exposed
and dragged into the light of day.
What is the essence of the deviation towards Great-Russian chauvinism under
our present conditions?
The essence of the deviation towards Great-Russian chauvinism lies in the
striving to ignore national differences in language, culture and way of
life; in the striving to prepare for the liquidation of the national republics
and regions; in the striving to undermine the principle of national equality
and to discredit the Party's policy of nationalising the administrative
apparatus, the press, the schools and other state and public organisations.
In this connection, the deviators of this type proceed from the view that
since, with the victory of socialism, the nations must merge into one and
their national languages must be transformed into a single common language,
the time has come to abolish national differences and to abandon the policy
of promoting the development of the national cultures of the formerly oppressed
peoples.
In this connection, they refer to Lenin, misquoting him and sometimes deliberately
distorting and slandering him.
Lenin said that under socialism the interests of the nationalities will
merge into a single whole—does it not follow from this that it is time
to put an end to the national republics and regions in the interests of
internationalism? Lenin
said in 1913, in his controversy with the Bundists, that the slogan of
national culture is a bourgeois slogan—does it not follow from this that
it is time to put an end to the national cultures of the peoples of the
USSR in the interests of . . . internationalism?
Lenin said that national oppression and national barriers are destroyed
under socialism—does it not follow from this that it is time to put a
stop to the policy of taking into account the specific national features
of the peoples of the USSR and to go over to the policy of assimilation
in the interests of . . . internationalism?And so on and so forth.
There can be no doubt that this deviation on the national question, disguised,
moreover, by a mask of internationalism and by the name of Lenin, is the
most subtle and therefore the most dangerous species of Great-Russian nationalism. Firstly,
Lenin never said
that national differences must disappear and that national languages must
merge into one common language within the borders of a single
state before
the victory of
socialism on a world scale. On
the contrary, Lenin
said something that was the very opposite of this, namely, that "national
and state differences among
peoples and countries ... . will continue to exist for a very,
very long time even
after the
dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world
scale" (Original Comment: JVS: My italics) (Vol. XXV, p. 227).
How can anyone refer to Lenin and forget about this fundamental statement
of his?True, Mr. Kautsky, an ex-Marxist and now a renegade and reformist, asserts
something that is the very opposite of what Lenin teaches us. Despite Lenin,
he asserts that the victory of the proletarian revolution in the Austro-German
federal state in the middle of the last century would have led to the formation
of a single, common German
language and to the Germanisation of
the Czechs, because "the mere force of unshackled intercourse, the mere
force of modern culture of which the Germans were the vehicles, without
any forcible Germanisation, would have converted into Germans the
backward Czech petty bourgeois, peasants and proletarians who had nothing
to gain from their decayed nationality" (see Preface
to the German edition of Revolution and Counter-revolution).It goes without saying that such a "conception" is in full accord with
Kautsky's social-chauvinism. It was these views of Kautsky's that I combated
in 1925 in my speech at the University of the Peoples of the East.
(Original Footnote: This refers to the address
delivered at a meeting of students of the Communist University of the Toilers
of the East, May 18, 1925 (see J. V. Stalin, "The Political Tasks of the
University of the Peoples of the East," Works, Vol. 7, pp. 141-42)
But can this anti-Marxist chatter of an arrogant German social-chauvinist
have any positive significance for us Marxists, who want to remain consistent
internationalists?Who is right, Kautsky or Lenin?If Kautsky is right, then how are we to explain the fact that relatively
backward nationalities like the Byelorussians and Ukrainians, who are closer
to the Great-Russians than the Czechs are to the Germans, have not become
Russified as a result of the victory of the proletarian revolution in the
USSR, but, on the contrary, have been regenerated and have developed
as independent nations? How are we to explain the fact that nations like
the Turkmenians, Kirghizians, Uzbeks, Tajiks (not to speak of the Georgians,
Armenians, Azerbaijanians,- and others), in spite of their backwardness,
far from becoming Russified as a result of the victory of socialism in
the USSR, have, on the contrary, been regenerated and have developed
into independent nations? Is it not evident that our worthy deviators,
in their hunt after a sham internationalism, have fallen into the clutches
of Kautskyan social-chanvinism? Is it not evident that in advocating a
single, common language within the borders of a single
state, within the
borders of the USSR, they are, in essence, striving to restore the
privileges of
the formerly predominant language, namely, the Great-Russian
language?What has this to do with internationalism? Secondly,
Lenin never said
that the abolition of national oppression and the merging of the interests
of nationalities into one whole is tantamount to the abolition of national
differences. We have abolished national oppression. We have abolished national
privileges and have established national equality of rights. We have abolished
state frontiers in the old sense of the term, frontier posts and customs
barriers between the nationalities of the USSR We have established
the unity of the economic and political interests of the peoples of the
USSR But does this mean that we have thereby abolished national differences,
national languages, culture, manner of life, etc.? Obviously it does not
mean this. But if national differences, languages, culture, manner of life,
etc.; have remained, is it not evident that the demand for the abolition
of the national republics and regions in the present historical period
is a reactionary demand directed against the interests of the dictatorship
of the proletariat? Do our deviators understand that to abolish the national
republics at the present time means depriving the vast masses of the peoples
of the USSR of the possibility of receiving education in their native
languages, depriving
them of the possibility of having schools, courts, administration, public
and other organisations and institutions in their native
languages, depriving them of the possibility of being drawn into the work
of socialist construction? Is it not evident that in their hunt after a
sham internationalism our deviators have fallen into the clutches of the
reactionary Great-Russian chauvinists and have forgotten, completely forgotten,
the slogan of the cultural revolution in the period of the dictatorship
of the proletariat which applies equally to all the peoples of the USSR;
both Great-Russian and non-Great-Russian? Thirdly,
Lenin never said
that the slogan of developing national culture under the conditions
of the dictatorship of the proletariat is a reactionary slogan.
On the contrary, Lenin always stood for helping
the peoples of the
USSR to develop their national cultures. It was under the guidance
of none other than Lenin that at the Tenth Congress of the Party, the resolution
on the national question was drafted and adopted, in which it is plainly
stated that:
"The Party's task is
to help the labouring masses of the non-Great Russian peoples
to catch up with Central Russia, which has gone in front, to help
them:a) to develop and
strengthen Soviet statehood among them in forms corresponding to the national
conditions and manner of life of these peoples;b) to develop and
strengthen among them courts administrations, economic and government bodies
functioning in their native language and staffed with local people familiar
with the manner of life and mentality of the local inhabitants;c) to develop among
them press, schools, theatres, clubs, and cultural and educational institutions
in general, functioning in the native languages;d) to set up and develop
a wide network of general-educational and trade and technical courses and
schools, functioning in the native languages."
(Original Footnote: See
Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU Congresses, Confrences and Centrla
Committee Plenums; Part 1, 1953, p.559).Is it not obvious
that Lenin stood wholly and entirely for the slogan of developing national
culture under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat?Is it not obvious
that to deny the slogan of national culture under the conditions of the
dictatorship of the proletariat means denying the necessity of raising
the cultural level of the non-Great-Russian peoples of the USSR, denying
the necessity of compulsory universal education for these peoples, means
putting these peoples into spiritual bondage to the reactionary nationalists?Lenin did indeed
qualify the slogan of national culture under the rule of the bourgeoisie
as a reactionary slogan. But could it be otherwise?What is national
culture under the rule of the national bourgeoisie? It is culture that
is bourgeois in content and national in form, having the
object of doping the masses with the poison of nationalism and of strengthening
the rule of the bourgeoisie.What is national
culture under the dictatorship of the proletariat? It is culture that is
socialist in content and national in form, having the object
of educating the masses in the spirit of socialism and internationalism.How is it possible
to confuse these two fundamentally different things without breaking with
Marxism?
Is it not obvious that in combating the slogan of national culture under
the bourgeois order, Lenin was striving at the bourgeois content of national culture
and not at its national form?
It would be foolish to suppose that Lenin regarded socialist culture as
non-national, as
not having a particular national form. The Bundists did at one time actually
ascribe this nonsense to Lenin. But it is known from the works of Lenin
that he protested sharply against this slander, and emphatically dissociated
himself from this nonsense. Have our worthy deviators really followed in
the footsteps of the Bundists?After all that has been said, what is left of the arguments of our deviators?
Nothing, except juggling with the flag of inter-nationalism and slander
against Lenin.
Those who are deviating towards Great-Russian chauvinism are profoundly
mistaken in believing that the period of building socialism in the USSR
is the period of the collapse and abolition of national cultures. The very
opposite is the case. In point of fact, the period of the dictatorship
of the proletariat and of the building of socialism in the USSR is
a period of the flowering of
national cultures that are socialist in content and national in form for
under the Soviet system, the nations themselves are not the ordinary "modern"
nations, but socialist nations
just as in content their national cultures are not the ordinary bourgeois
cultures, but socialist cultures.
They apparently fail to understand that national cultures are bound to
develop with new
strength with
the introduction and firm establishment of compulsory universal
elementary education in the native languages. They fail to understand that
only if the national cultures are developed will it be possible really
to draw the backward nationalities into the work of socialist construction.They fail to
understand that it is just this that is the basis of the Leninist policy
of helping and promoting
the development of the national cultures of the peoples
of the USSR.
It may seem strange that we who stand for the future merging
of national cultures into one common (both in form and content) culture,
with one common language, should at the same time stand for the flowering
of national cultures at the present moment, in the period of the
dictatorship of the proletariat. But there is nothing strange about it.
The national cultures must be allowed to develop and unfold, to reveal
all their potentialities, in order to create the conditions for merging
them into one common culture with one common language in the period of
the victory of social-ism all over the world. The flowering of cultures
that are national in form and socialist in content under the dictatorship
of the proletariat in one country for the purpose of merging
them into one common socialist (both in form and content) culture, with
one common language, when the proletariat is victorious all over the world
and when socialism becomes the way of life—it is just this that constitutes
the dialectics of the Leninist presentation of the question of national
culture.
It may be said that such a presentation of the question is "contradictory."
But is there not the same "contradictoriness" in our presentation of the
question of the state? We stand for the withering away of the state. At
the same time we stand for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the
proletariat, which is the mightiest and strongest state power that has
ever existed. The highest development of state power with the object of
preparing the conditions for the
withering away of state-power—such is the Marxist formula. Is this "contradictory"?
Yes, it is "contradictory." But this contradiction is bound up with life,
and it fully reflects Marx's dialectics.
Or, for example, Lenin's presentation of the question of the right of nations
to self-determination, including the right to secession. Lenin sometimes
depicted the thesis on national self-determination in the guise of the
simple formula: "disunion for union." Think of it—disunion for union.
It even sounds like a paradox. And yet, this "contradictory', formula reflects
that living truth of Marx's dialectics which enables the Bolsheviks to
capture the most impregnable fortresses in the sphere of the national question.
The same may be said about the formula relating to national culture: the
flowering of national cultures (and languages) in the period of the dictatorship
of the proletariat in one country with the object of preparing the conditions
for their withering away and merging into one common socialist culture
(and into one common language) in the period of the victory of socialism
all over the world.Anyone who
fails to understand this peculiar feature and "contradiction" of our transition
period, anyone who fails to understand these dialectics of the historical
processes, is dead as far as Marxism is concerned.
The misfortune of our deviators is that they do not understand, and do
not wish to understand, Marx's dialectics.
That is how matters stand as regards the deviation towards Great-Russian
chauvinism.
It is not difficult to understand that this deviation reflects the striving
of the moribund classes of the formerly dominant Great-Russian nation to
recover their lost privileges.
Hence the danger of Great-Russian chauvinism as the chief danger in the
Party in the sphere of the national question.
What is the essence of the deviation towards local nationalism?
The essence of the deviation towards local nationalism is the endeavour
to isolate and segregate oneself within the shell of one's own nation,
the endeavour to slur over class contradictions within one's own nation,
the endeavour to protect oneself from Great-Russian chauvinism by withdrawing
from the general stream of socialist construction, the endeavour not to
see what draws together and unites the labouring masses of the nations
of the USSR and to see only what can draw them apart from one another.
The deviation towards local nationalism reflects the discontent of the
moribund classes of the formerly oppressed nations with the regime of the
dictatorship of the proletariat, their striving to isolate themselves in
their national bourgeois state and to establish their class rule there.
The danger of this deviation is that it cultivates bourgeois nationalism,
weakens the unity of the working people of the different nations of the
USSR and plays into the hands of the interventionists.
Such is the essence of the deviation towards local nationalism.
The party's task is to wage a determined struggle against this deviation
and to ensure the conditions necessary for the education of the labouring
masses of the peoples of the USSR in the spirit of internationalism.
That is how matters stand with the deviations in our Party, with the "Left"
and Right deviations in the sphere of general policy, and with the deviations
in the sphere of the national question.
Such is our inner-Party situation.
Now that the Party has emerged victoriously from the struggle for the general
line, now that our Party's Leninist line is triumphant along the whole
front, many are inclined to forget the difficulties that were created for
us in our work by all kinds of deviators. More than that, to this day some
philistine-minded comrades still think that we could have managed without
a struggle against the deviators. Needless to say, those comrades are profoundly
mistaken. It is enough to look back and recall the handiwork of the Trotskyists
and Right deviators, it is enough to recall the history of the struggle
against deviations during the past period, to understand the utter vacuity
and futility of this party philistinism. There can be no doubt that if
we had not curbed the deviators and routed them in open struggle, we could
not have achieved the successes of which our Party is now justly proud.In the struggle
against deviations from the Leninist line our Party grew and gained strength.
In the struggle against deviations it forged the Leninist unity
of its ranks. Nobody now denies the
indisputable fact that the Party has never been so united around its Central
Committee as it is now. Everybody is now obliged to admit that the Party
is now more united and
solid than
ever before, that the Sixteenth Congress is one of the few congresses of
our Party at which there is no longer a definitely formed and united opposition
capable of counterposing its separate line to the Party's general line.
To what is the Party indebted for this decisive achievement?
It is indebted for this achievement to the circumstance that in its struggle
against deviations it always pursued a policy based on principle,
that it never sank to backstairs combinations or diplomatic huckstering.
Lenin said that a policy based on principle is the sole correct
policy. We emerged victoriously from the struggle against deviations because
we honestly and consistently carried out this behest of Lenin's. (Applause.)I shall now conclude, comrades.
What is the general conclusion?
During the past period we have achieved a number of decisive
successes on all the fronts of socialist construction. We achieved these
successes because we were able to hold aloft the great banner of Lenin.
If we want to be victorious we must continue
to hold aloft the banner of Lenin and keep it pure and unstained. (Applause.)Such is the general conclusion.With the banner of Lenin
we triumphed in the battles for the October Revolution.With the banner of Lenin
we have achieved decisive successes in the struggle for the victory of
socialist construction.With this banner we shall
triumph in the proletarian revolution all over the world.Long live Leninism !
(Loud and prolonged applause. An ovation from the entire
hall.)Pravda, No. 177, June 1930
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